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INSTITUTIONAL OVERSIGHT OF
CLINICAL TRIALS AND THE DRUG
APPROVAL PROCESS©
PAUL B. MILLER*
The institutional and federal bodies responsible for
regulatory review and oversight of clinical trials in
Canada serve distinct yet complementary functions in
ensuring that clinical trials provide scientifically
rigorous and ethically sound evaluation of new
therapeutic products. To date, academics and
reformers alike have discussed reform priorities for
federal and institutional review in isolation, as if their
guiding purposes are distinct. This article identifies the
overlapping objectives of federal and institutional
review, argues for the importance of coordination of
institutional and federal oversight structures, and
identifies potential points of coordination.
Les organismes institutionnels et frdrraux
responsables de la critique, du point de vue de la
rfglementation, et de l'observation des essais cliniques
au Canada, accomplissent des fonctions distinctes,
mais complrmentaires, en assurant que les essais
cliniques fournissent une 6valuation scientifiquement
rigoureuse et 6thiquement saine des nouveaux
produits thrrapeutiques. A ce jour, les universitaires et
les r~formateurs ont, au m me titre, discut6 isolfment
des priorit~s de rrforme pour la critique frd~rale et
institutionnelle, comme si les objectifs qui les guident
6taient distincts. Cet article identifie les objectifs
emboitds de la revue f~d ral et institutionnelle, plaide
l'importance de la coordination des structures
d'observation institutionnelle et frdrrale, et rep re les
points possibles de coordination.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The institutional and federal bodies responsible for regulatory
review and oversight of clinical trials in Canada serve distinct yet
complementary functions in ensuring scientifically rigorous and ethically
sound evaluation of new therapeutic products. The principal mandate of
institutional Research Ethics Boards (REBs) is to protect the rights and
welfare of research subjects through initial and ongoing review for
compliance with predetermined substantive and procedural norms. The
Therapeutic Products Directorate of Health Canada (TPD) is
responsible for ensuring the relative safety and efficacy of new
therapeutic products1 by conducting pre-marketing and post-marketing
reviews, and, more recently, by overseeing the conduct of clinical trials.
To date, academics and reformers alike have approached federal and
institutional review as though their guiding purposes are entirely
distinct. The TPD's recent-if forced-recognition of its responsibility
for the oversight of ongoing clinical trials in Canada provides an
opportunity to question the prevailing approach. This article seizes the
opportunity to do so.
The argument will proceed as follows. Part I explains the
purpose of clinical trials and their importance to clinical medicine. Part
II establishes the importance of regulatory oversight of clinical trials,
reviews the emergence of the institutional and federal oversight
structures, then presents and assesses recent recommendations for
regulatory reform. Part III employs a case study to advance an argument
'Save for biologics. Review and approval of biologics is the responsibility of the Biologics
and Genetic Therapies Directorate.
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for the importance of coordination of institutional and federal oversight,
and identifies potential points of coordination.
II. CLINICAL TRIALS
A. General background on clinical trials
Clinical trials are experiments that evaluate the safety and
efficacy of experimental therapeutic products. The most common form
of clinical trial is the randomized controlled trial (RCT).2 RCTs can vary
considerably in the details of scientific design (e.g. whether single,
double, or triple blinding' is used, or whether placebo and/or active
controls4 are employed). Common to all RCTs, and central to their
superiority as a means of generating credible scientific evidence, are the
controlled conditions5 under which the experiment is undertaken, the
statistical analysis of the study data to determine the extent to which
they can be generalized, and the random assignment of the experimental
and control modalities to subjects.6 The most common therapeutic
interventions tested by way of the RCT are pharmaceuticals.7 The
2 Robert J. Levine, Ethics and Regulation of Clinical Research, 2d ed. (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1986) at 185.
' In single-blinded trials, subjects do not know which modality they are receiving (ie.
experimental treatment, standard treatment and/or placebo) until the completion of the trial. In
double-blinded trials neither the subject nor the investigator knows who is receiving which modality
until the completion of the trial. In triple-blinded trials, neither the patient, nor the researcher, nor
the person analyzing the data knows who is receiving which modality until the completion of the
trial. The binding process is used as a control against bias.
'A placebo is an inert substance with known properties. When used in RCrs, the placebo is
a control, or baseline, against which to measure the safety and efficacy of the experimental
treatment. Active controls are also used as a baseline, but they are substances and/or interventions
of proven (or at least accepted) therapeutic merit. Generally, either placebo or active controls are
employed in RCTs-the former enables the trial to generate data as to the absolute safety and
efficacy of the experimental treatment, and the latter enables the trial to generate comparative data
as to the safety and efficacy of the experimental and accepted, treatment(s).
' For example, inclusion criteria for the enrollment of subjects ensure that they share
relevant characteristics, and that the phases of the research are conducted in similar institutions
according to predetermined procedures explained in the study protocol.
6 For an excellent treatment of the arguments for and against RCTs, grounded in a more
wide-ranging analysis of the history and philosophy of the experimental sciences, see Deborah G.
Mayo, Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1996), in particular, c. 5 at 128.
'Levine, supra note 2.
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analysis provided here addresses the oversight of clinical trials of
pharmaceuticals.8
Larger RCTs-the sort that would generate evidence sufficient to
support an application for federal marketing approval-can be
conducted only subsequent to smaller experiments that give evidence of
sufficient promise. The very first tests of the experimental treatment are
pre-clinical animal studies. These are essential to ensuring the safety of
human subjects in clinical trials given that approximately one in one
thousand tested substances survives pre-clinical screening.9 The U.S.
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the TPD classify clinical trials
of pharmaceuticals according to four categories or "phases"1":
1. Phase I trials are those in which the experimental drug is first
introduced to humans (usually healthy volunteers) in order to develop
its pharmacological profile. The profile includes data as to the
absorption, metabolism, and excretion of the drug, the safe dosage
range, the relative efficacy of different routesof administration, and the
side effects.
2. Phase II trials are generally the first in which the experimental
drug is introduced to patients with the condition the drug is expected to
ameliorate. These trials involve limited numbers of closely monitored
subjects and are intended to establish a safe dosage. They also give a
preliminary indication of the drug's efficacy.
3. Phase III trials are large-scale studies of the experimental
drug. Most are RCTS. Often, thousands of patients are enrolled in any
given Phase III trial. These trials are intended to generate data as to the
safety and efficacy of the experimental drug that can be generalized for
the patient population. Phase III trials are conducted with the hope that
favourable data will accrue in support of the pharmaceutical
manufacturer's application for TPD marketing approval.
8 Note that the oversight bodies discussed below oversee a wider range of human subjects
research. REBs review all research involving humans that comes within the funding mandates of the
three major Canadian public funding agencies (Canadian Institutes of Health Research, Social
Sciences and Humanities Research Council, and Natural Sciences and Engineering Research
Council). The TPD assesses the quality, safety, and efficacy of medical devices and disinfectants, in
addition to pharmaceuticals.
9 Arnold S. Relman & Marcia Angell, "America's Other Drug Problem: How the Drug
Industry Distorts Medicine and Politics" The New Republic (16 December 2002) 27 at 28.
"See Levine, supra note 2 at 6-7.
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4. Phase IV trials are primarily post-marketing or "surveillance"
studies, which are conducted in order to determine whether the drug
has long-term side effects. Other Phase IV studies include testing of the
drug on other populations (e.g. children) or for indications other than
those for which approval was granted.
According to Arnold Relman and Marcia Angell, only one in
five substances that enter Phase I testing in the United States will
survive the FDA marketing approval process."i Citing a study by Joseph
DiMasi and his colleagues, American pharmaceutical manufacturers
claim that research and development costs 802 million U.S. dollars for
each drug that ultimately makes it to market.12 Industry critics, including
Relman and Angell, dispute these figures.' 3 They claim that research
and development costs are closer to 266 million U.S. dollars per new
molecular entityt" approved, once opportunity costs are factored out and
tax savings are factored in. Data from Statistics Canada put gross
investment in health research in Canada at $5.7 billion in 2004, an
increase of $463 million since 2003 and a remarkable $3.6 billion since
1994.15 Data cited in the 2004 Annual Report of the Patented Medicine
Prices Review Board indicate that the brand-name pharmaceuticals
industry invested $1 billion in health research in Canada in 2004,16 fully
"Relman & Angell, supra note 9.
'
2 Joseph A. DiMasi, Ronald W. Hanson & Henry G. Grabowski, "The Price of Innovation:
New Estimates of Drug Development Costs" (2003) 22 J. Health Econ. 151.
13 Relman & Angell, supra note 9. See also Marcia Angell, The Truth About Drug
Companies (New York: Random House, 2004) at 37-51. For more rigorous criticism, and for
DiMasi and his colleagues' response, see Donald W. Light & Rebecca N. Warburton,
"Extraordinary Claims Require Extraordinary Evidence" (2005) 24 J. Health Econ. 1030; Joseph A.
DiMasi, Ronald W. Hanson & Henry G. Grabowski, "Reply: Extraordinary Claims Require
Extraordinary Evidence" (2005) 24 J. Health Econ. 1034; Donald W. Light & Rebecca N.
Warburton, "Setting the Record Straight in the Reply by DiMasi, Hanson and Grabowski" (2005)
24 J. Health Econ. 1045; and Joseph A. DiMasi, Ronald W. Hanson & Henry G. Grabowski,
"Setting the Record Straight on Setting the Record Straight: Response to the Light and Warburton
Rejoinder"(2005) 24 J. Health Econ. 1049.
1" New molecular entities are "drugs whose active ingredients are newly discovered or
synthesised molecules." The research and development costs for so-called "me too" drugs are much
less. Relman & Angell, ibid. at 28-30.
' Statistics Canada, Estimates of Total Expenditures on Research and Development in the
Health Field in Canada, 1988-2004 (Service Bulletin) (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2005).
16 Patented Medicine Prices Review Board, Annual Report 2004 (Ottawa: Patented
Medicine Prices Review Board, 2004) at 29.
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half the corporate investment in health research in 2004 as measured in
light of Statistics Canada figures.17
In a Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement accompanying the
new clinical trials regulations in 2001, the TPD indicated that it reviewed
"over 800" applications for approval to proceed with clinical trials in
1998, and that it has witnessed a 20 per cent average annual increase in
clinical trials conducted in Canada. 8 If this rate of increase had
remained stable, the TPD would have received approximately 1,658
applications to conduct clinical trials in 2002. Evidently, the rate of
increase has jumped significantly, for, as of January 2002, the TPD
estimated that approximately 4,000 clinical trials would be conducted in
Canada in 2002.19 No similar estimate has since been made for
subsequent years. Given that no federal officials in the United States or
Canada collect data on human subjects enrolled in clinical trials, reliable
estimates of the numbers of subjects enrolled per annum are impossible
to make. Very rudimentary estimates put the figure at approximately
18,000,00020 in the United States and between 100,0002 and 1,800,00022
in Canada. Parexel's Pharmaceutical R&D Statistical Sourcebook
suggests a median number of 4,186 enrolled patients per clinical trial in
the United States in 2001, with median numbers for the period from
1998 to 2001 ranging from a low of 3,840 to a high of 5,435.23 Assuming
that the average (4,637) holds for Canada, and that the TPD's prediction
of numbers of trials for 2002 was roughly accurate, existing estimates of
17 Statistics Canada, supra note 15.
i8 Regulations Amending the Food and Drug Regulations (1024 - Clinical Trials), P.C.
2001-1042, C. Gaz. 2001.11.1116 at 1139 [Regulations].
" Health Products and Food Branch Inspectorate, Health Canada, Inspection Strategy for
Clinical Trials (Ottawa: Health Canada, 2002) at 6 [Inspection Stratey]. Note that not all of these
trials will necessarily be financed by the pharmaceuticals industry.
20 Adil E. Shamoo, "Adverse Event Reporting - The Tip of an Iceberg" (2001) 8 Account.
Res. 197.
21 "Drug Trials" CBC Marketplace (18 March 2003), online: CBC News
< http://www.cbc.ca/consumers/market/files/health/drug trials/index.html>.
' Trudo Lemmens & Paul B. Miller, "The Human Subjects Trade: Ethical and Legal
Issues Surrounding Recruitment Incentives" (2003) 31 J. L. Med. Ethics 398 at 400.
1 Parexel International, Pharmaceutical R&D Statistical Sourcebook (Barnett
International, 2002) at 108, cited in James Love, "Evidence Regarding Research and Development
Investments in Innovative and Non-Innovative Medicines," online: Consumer Project on
Technology <http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/rnd/evidenceregardingrnd.pdf>. Note that these
figures exclude trials for drugs used to treat orphan diseases. These trials are considerably smaller.
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numbers of subjects enrolled in clinical trials per annum in Canada may
be conservative.
B. The importance of clinical trials
Clinical trials are of obvious economic importance, in both the
United States and Canada. Clinical trials provide the evidentiary
foundation for every pharmaceutical manufacturer's application for
marketing approval of its products. On the strength of sales of its
products, the pharmaceuticals industry has become an economic
powerhouse and is an increasingly important sector of industrial
economies. According to Angell, Americans spend 200 billion U.S.
dollars per year on prescription drugs.24 The American pharmaceutical
industry realizes incredible profits, with some reports of average profits
(18.3 per cent of revenues) ranking well above the median for all other
industries (3.3 per cent of revenues).' Likewise, Canadian spending on
pharmaceuticals is significant. The Canadian Institute for Health
Information (CIHI) reports that Canadian spent $21.8 billion on
prescription and non-prescription drugs in 2004.6 Spending on
prescription drugs is estimated to have accounted for $18 billion of that
figure.27 Overall drug spending is increasing at a staggering rate, with
2004 levels representing an increase of 8.8 per cent from 2003.'
Spending on prescription drugs is increasing at an even higher rate, with
2004 levels representing an increase of 10.2 per cent from 2003.29 In
2004, Canadians spent nearly twice the amount previously spent on
prescription and non-prescription drugs in 2001 ($12.3 billion), and five
times the amount spent in 1985 ($3.8 billion). 30 According to CIHI, total
drug spending in Canada has increased at an average annual rate of 9.7
24 Angell, supra note 13 at 3.
2 Relman & Angell, supra note 9. See also Angell, ibid. at 10-13. Note, however, that it has
been contended that reported profits are inflated. See U.S., Office of Technology Assessment,
Pharmaceutical R&. Costs, Risks and Rewards (Washington: United States Government Printing
Office, 1993) at 73-104.
26 Canadian Institute for Health Information, Drug Expenditure in Canada, 19852004
(Ottawa: Canadian Institute for Health Information, 2005) at i.
27 Ibid. at 7.
28ibid. at 3.
20 Ibid. at 7.
30 Ibid. at 3.
2006]
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per cent over the past twenty years, a rate which well exceeds inflation
and population growth rates.3' For its part, Canada's Research-Based
Pharmaceutical Companies (Rx&D), a Canadian trade organization
representing brand-name pharmaceuticals companies, emphasizes the
sector's contribution to the Canadian economy. It claims that the
pharmaceutical industry is responsible for 24,000 jobs and $8.3 billion in
research and development investment since 1993.32
More important than the economic impact of clinical trials is
their primacy of place within evidence-based medicine (EBM). Michel
Foucault once argued that despite clear ties to the sciences, clinical
medicine for a long time did not qualify as a science because of its
questionable epistemic foundations: "[I]t involve[d] a scarcely organized
mass of empirical observations, uncontrolled experiments and results,
therapeutic prescriptions, and institutional regulations., 33 While it has
long been accepted that some degree of uncertainty is inevitable in
medicine,34 over the past ten to fifteen years the EBM program has been
heralded as a means of reducing avoidable risk, uncertainty, and waste
in medical care.35 Responding in part to disturbing evidence of
geographical variation in medical practice patterns,36 proponents of EBM
have argued that teaching students and physicians to adopt an informed,
critical perspective on the evidentiary basis for their clinical decisions
helps to achieve the ideals of medically appropriate and economically
Ibid. at i.
32 Canada's Research-Based Pharmaceutical Companies, "Towards Increasing Research
and Development in Canada: A New Innovative Pharmaceutical Strategy" (October 2004) at 5,
online:' Canada's Research-Based Pharmaceutical Companies <http://www.canadapharma.org/
Industry _Publications/RXD-ElectionGuide.pdf>.
Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. by A.M. Sheridan Smith (New
York: Dorset Press, 1972) at 181, cited in Lars Noah, "Medicine's Epistemology: Mapping the
Haphazard Diffusion of Knowledge in the Biomedical Community" (2002) 44 Ariz. L. Rev. 373 at
375 [Noah, "Medicine's Epistemology"].
4 Renee C. Fox, "The Evolution of Medical Uncertainty" (1980) 58 Milbank Q. 1; Eric B.
Beresford, "Uncertainty and the Shaping of Medical Decisions" (1991) Hastings Center Rep. 6.
'1 The classic text is David L. Sackett, R. Brian Haynes & Peter Tugwell, Clinical
Epidemiology. A Basic Science for Clinical Medicine (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1985).
See also David L. Sackett et al., "Evidence Based Medicine: What It Is and What It Isn't" (1996)
312 Brit. Med. J. 71.
36 See e.g. John E. Wennberg, "Dealing with Medical Practice Patterns: A Proposal for
Action" (1984) 3:2 Health Aff. 6; David M. Eddy, "Variations in Physician Practice: The Role of
Uncertainty" (1984).3:2 Health Aff. 74; and Arnold S. Relman, "Assessment and Accountability:
The Third Revolution in Medical Care" (1988) 319 New Eng. J. Med. 1220.
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efficient care. The point is not merely to teach physicians the
importance of basing patient care on evidence; rather, it is also to teach
them to discriminate between alternative courses of action through a
process of comparison based on a hierarchical categorization of
different forms of evidence. As an early guide to EBM put it,
optimistically invoking Kuhn:37
A new paradigm for medical practice is emerging. Evidence-based medicine de-
emphasizes intuition, unsystematic clinical experience, and pathophysiologic rationale as
sufficient grounds for clinical decision-making, and stresses the examination of evidence
from clinical research. Evidence-based medicine requires new skills of the physician,
including efficient literature-searching, and the application of formal rules of evidence in
evaluating the clinical literature.
38
Physicians currently trained in EBM are taught to base their
clinical decisions on evidence in the following order of preference (from
most to least preferred): systematic reviews of RCTs; individual RCTS
published in peer-reviewed journals; uncontrolled trials (e.g.
observational studies); and anecdotal reports of peer observations.39 The
evidence that emerges from completed clinical trials thus sits at the apex
of the evidentiary pyramid established by EBM. Indeed, the clinical trial's
rise to prominence must be recognized as intimately interrelated with
the emergence of EBM.4 ° When the founders of EBM identified
variations in practice patterns, they argued that the cause was faulty
3 7Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1973). Kuhn would likely have been wary of the (common) suggestion that the
"revolution" in medicine ushered by EBM can be understood in terms of his discussion of paradigms
in his theory of the dynamics of theory change in science. Kuhn was himself trained in the natural
sciences (theoretical physics), and was candid about the limitations of his work with respect to the
social and human sciences. He seems to have included medicine in the latter category. See Thomas
S. Kuhn, "The Natural and the Human Sciences" in The Road Since Structure (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 2000) 216. See also Eugenic Gatens-Robinson, "Clinical Judgment and the
Rationality of the Human Sciences" (1986) 11 J. Med. Philos. 167.
-' "Evidence-Based Medicine: A New Approach to Teaching the Practice of Medicine"
(1992) 268 J.A.M.A. 2420 at 2420 ["Evidence-Based Medicine"].
-' Gordon H. Guyatt et at, "Evidence-Based Medicine: Principles for Applying the Users'
Guides to Patient Care" (2000) 284 J.A.M.A. 1290 at 1292-93.
40 "The foundations of the paradigm shift lie in developments in clinical research over the
last 30 years. In 1960, the randomized clinical trial was an oddity. It is now accepted that virtually
no drug can enter clinical practice without a demonstration of its efficacy in clinical trials."
"Evidence-Based Medicine," supra note 38 at 2422. See also Marks' superb treatment of the history
of clinical research: Harry M. Marks, The Progress of Experiment. Science and Therapeutic
Reform in the United States, 1900-1990 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
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clinical decision making based on outmoded-and, indeed, potentially
dangerous-adherence to experience, opinion, and habit. Further, in
retrospect, it was only logical for EBM's progenitors to look to clinical
trials for a firmer foundation for clinical decision making. Well before
the variations in practice patterns became well publicized, controlled
clinical trials had garnered recognition for their ability to produce
reliable, verifiable 'evidence on the safety and efficacy of new and
established treatments.41
While the intertwined successes of EBM and RCTs have been the
subject of considerable debate,42 there can be little doubt that they have
become a firmly entrenched part of medical education. Likewise,
reliance upon clinical trials for the production of medical knowledge has
become fixed. Still, much work remains. Clinical trials of new
therapeutic products are being conducted in ever increasing numbers,
and the efficacy of many established therapeutic interventions is in need
of validation. Some suggest that the efficacy of as many as 50 per cent of
therapeutic interventions have now been validated by way of clinical
trial;43 others suggest the figure is closer to 20 per cent.44 In either case,
the -current directions of medical science and pharmaceutical product
development are aligned.45  Given the confluence of academic
confidence and industry interest in clinical trials, it seems reasonable to
predict that the numbers of clinical trials conducted per annum will
increase exponentially. With evidence suggesting bias in the results of
4
" Marks, ibid.
42 See Sandra J. Tanenbaum, "What Physicians Know" (1993) 329 New Eng. J. Med. 1268;
C. David Naylor, "Grey Zones of Clinical Practice: Some Limits to Evidence-Based Medicine"
(1995) 345 Lancet 840; Jason Grossman & Fiona J. Mackenzie, "The Randomized Controlled
Trial: Gold Standard or Merely Standard?" (2005) 48 Persp. Biol. Med. 516; and Robyn Bluhm,
"From Hierarchy to Network: A Richer View of Evidence for Evidence-Based Medicine" (2005) 48
Persp. Biol. Med. 535.
43J. Ellis et a., "Inpatient General Medicine is Evidence-Based" (1995) 346 Lancet 407.
' Noah, "Medicine's Epistemology," supra note 33 at 388.
4 Regulatory agencies led the way in establishing the clinical trial as the evidentiary
benchmark for therapies employed in clinical medicine. Beginning in the 1960s and 1970s, the FDA
required pharmaceuticals manufacturers to prove efficacy through -submitting the results of
multiple clinical trials with their applications for marketing approval. See Harold Edgar & David J.
Rothman, "New Rules for New Drugs: The Challenge of AIDs to the Regulatory Process" (1990) 68
Milbank Q. 111.
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industry-sponsored clinical trials4 6 and industry influence over the
development of clinical practice guidelines,47 the public interest in the
integrity of EBM and clinical science demands that the institutional and
federal regulatory oversight structures be improved.
III. REGULATORY OVERSIGHT OF CLINICAL TRIALS
A. The emergence of regulatory oversight structures in the United
States
Today, few people would seriously question the need for some
form of regulatory oversight of the conduct of clinical trials, and scrutiny
of the conclusions reached by clinical trials. Though it was not always
the case, the public stake in the conduct of clinical trials is now almost
universally recognized to be extremely high. The institutional ethics
review and the federal therapeutic products approval structures
emerged first in the United States, largely in response to public crises of
confidence in the conduct of science.48
In retrospect, the importance of establishing a scientific basis for
manufacturers' claims as to the merits of their therapeutic products
seems obvious. However, it was not always recognized as such. The
Joel Lexchin et al, "Pharmaceutical Industry Sponsorship and Research Outcome and
Quality: Systematic Review" (2003) 326 Brit. Med. J. 1167; Bodil Als-Nielsen et al, "Association of
Funding and Conclusions in Randomized Drug Trials: Reflection of Treatment Effect or Adverse
Events? (2003) 290 J.A.M.A. 921; Lisa L. Kjaergard & Bodil Ads-Nielsen, "Association Between
Competing Interests and Authors' Conclusions: Epidemiological Study of Randomised Clinical
Trials Published in the BMJ" (2003) 325 Brit. Med. J. 249; Mohit Bhandari et al, "Association
Between Industry Funding and Statistically Significant Pro-Industry Findings in Medical and
Surgical Randomized Trials" (2004) 170 Can. Med. Assoc. J. 477; American Medical Association,
Influence of Funding Source on Outcome, Validity, and Reliability of Pharmaceutical Research
[Report #ig (American Medical Association, 2004); Joel R. Lexchin, "Implications of
Pharmaceutical Industry Funding on Clinical Research" (2005) 39 Ann. Pharmacother. 197; and
Paul M. Ridker & Jose Torres, "Reported Outcomes in Major Cardiovascular Clinical Trials
Funded by For-Profit and Not-for-Profit Organizations: 2000-2005" (2006) 295 J.A.M.A. 2270.
" George N. Papanikolaou et al, "Reporting Conflicts of Interest in Guidelines of
Preventative and Therapeutic Interventions" (2001) 1 BMC Med. Res. Methodol. 3; Niteesh K.
Choudhry, Henry T. Stelfox & Allan S. Detsky, "Relationships Between Authors of Clinical
Practice Guidelines and the Pharmaceutical Industry" (2002) 287 J.A.M.A. 612.
I am not suggesting that there have not been troubling research scandals of our own in
the Canadian research community. But by and large, the Canadian institutional and federal review
structures were not developed in response to Canadian controversies. Rather, these structures were
developed subsequent to, and modelled closely on, those that emerged in the United States.
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public has a strong appetite for products promising to cure or prevent
diseases, alleviate pain, and increase vitality. As high levels of spending
on pharmaceuticals attest, the public appetite for therapeutic products
has not waned with time. Arguably, the public's tolerance of risk has
changed concomitantly with the rise of university-based scientific
medicine. At one time, self-selected quack therapies were widely
accepted as the best medicine had to offer.49 But with the rise of
professional medicine and increased faith in the capabilities of scientific
medicine to test and verify therapeutic products, the public has grown
more risk-averse to therapeutic products, and more concerned about
scientific validation.5" Consumers now want to know that products will
deliver the therapeutic benefits promised, and that the costs of
consumption, in terms of possible side effects, are acceptable.5
Recognition of the need for reliable scientific evidence of the
safety and efficacy of pharmaceuticals, of the fact that clinical trials
represent the best available means of generating that evidence, and of
the necessity of regulatory scrutiny of the results of clinical trials came
long before clinical trials achieved privileged epistemic status within
clinical medicine. As has often been the case in the history of regulatory
responses to public health and environmental risks, the establishment of
modern, regulatory structures for the oversight of therapeutic products
was not the achievement of a prescient government. 52 In the United
States, where modern regulatory structures for the oversight of
therapeutic products first developed, public fears generated the political
will for increased regulatory intervention. The FDA ballooned in size
and power largely in response to the public fear and outrage provoked
49 See e.g. Roy Porter's study of self-medication and lay healing: "The Patient in England,
c. 1660-c. 1800" in Andrew Wear, ed., Medicine in Society. Historical Essays (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1992) 91.
o On the historical and philosophical context for the increase in public faith in, and
expectations of, scientific medicine, see Guenter B. Risse, "Medicine in the Age of Enlightenment"
in Wear, ibid., 149.
5t This demand, however, is not uniform in all consumers. As the market for herbal
remedies, nutritional supplements and other alternative health products attests, the public still has
a considerable appetite for self-selected products whose claims of therapeutic merit have not been
scientifically validated.
' See Jeremy D. Fraiberg & Michael J. Trebilcock, "Risk Regulation: Technocratic and
Democratic Tools for Regulatory Reform" (1998) 43 McGill L.J. 835 at 840-44.
' For a detailed history of the regulatory system in the United States, see John Abraham,
Science, Politics and the Pharmaceutical Industry(London: Taylor & Francis, 1995).
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by the thalidomide scandal.54 In 1962, the U.S. government deemed that
the public interest would be best served by a publicly funded
administrative agency with the expertise required to protect the general
population.55 With a public mistrustful of the motives of drug
manufacturers, and demanding the protective intervention of the
government, the expanded FDA received a Congressional mandate to
evaluate drugs for safety and efficacy as a condition of marketing
approval.56 Unable to meet its new mandate through review of
traditional supporting materials (largely physician anecdotes and
uncontrolled observational studies), the FDA began to champion
approval based on sound science. For the FDA, sound science meant
that the manufacturer's statements regarding the indications, safety, and
efficacy of its product must be supported by evidence from multiple
well-designed clinical trials.5
The history of the institutional ethics review system reveals a
similar dynamic of scandal and regulatory response. Whereas the
emergence of the modern FDA was a response to public fears over the
safety of therapeutic products and mistrust of industry, the institutional
review system emerged in response to public outrage over disregard for
the rights and welfare of human research subjects and growing mistrust
of scientists.
Public sensitivity to the potential for abuse of research subjects
was heightened internationally with the widely publicized revelations of
Nazi scientists' horrific experiments on non-consenting subjects.58 Yet,
in North America, public pressure for the regulatory oversight of
research only reached its breaking point following revelations of the
4 Louis Lasagna, "Congress, the FDA, and New Drug Development: Before and After
1962" (1989) 32 Persp. Biol. Med. 322.
' On wider shifts in public faith in the protection afforded by expert review within
administrative agencies, see Lars Noah, "Scientific Republicanism: Expert Peer Review and the
Quest for Regulatory Deliberation" (2000) 49 Emory L.J. 1033.
6Prior to 1962, the FDA conducted post- rather than pre-marketing approval, based solely
on safety data submitted by manufacturers: Lasagna, supra note 54 at 324. See Drug Amendments
of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780.
"
7Edgar & Rothman, supra note 45 at 117-18.
I See generally Robert J. Lifton, The Nazi Doctor: Medical Killing and the Psychology of
Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 1986); George J. Annas & Michael A. Grodin, eds., The Nazi
Doctors and the Nuremberg Code (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
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abuse of subjects by North American scientists. 9 The pressure mounted
with the 1966 publication of an article by Harvard medical professor
Henry Beecher, which chronicled twenty-two trials in which U.S.
researchers risked "the health or the life of their subjects" without
obtaining consent or permission. 6' Beecher stated that these trials were
but a small sampling of those he collected, and that given the ease with
which they were collected, one could only conclude that the rights and
welfare of subjects were being routinely ignored in clinical research in
the United States. By all accounts, Beecher's article attracted a great
deal of media attention and, in consequence, provoked considerable
public outcry and feelings of mistrust.61
The Beecher article was preceded by two disturbing studies
sponsored by the National Institutes of Health (NIH). In one, a
chimpanzee kidney was transplanted into a non-consenting patient; in
the other, live cancer cells were injected into non-consenting indigent
patients at the Brooklyn Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital. 62 Already
concerned about the potential for liability and public outrage in
connection with these cases, the director of the NIH needed little
prompting when asked by a congressman for the NIH's response to the
Beecher article. Efforts slowly mounted towards development of a
uniform policy for the protection of human subjects in NIH-sponsored
research. The first step was a directive issued in 1966 from then Surgeon
General William H. Stewart that required all institutions receiving
public funding to give written assurance of "independent assessment"
63
of the risks and' benefits, and the adequacy of the consent process for
s9 President's Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments, "Postwar
Professional Standards and Practices for Human Experiments" in The Human Radiation
Experiments Final Report of the President's Advisory Committee (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1996) 74 at 84-92 [Human Radiation Experiments]. There were disturbing pre-war abuses
documented in the United States, but none galvanized public attention sufficiently to generate
political will to action. See Susan Lederer, Subjected to Science. Human Experimentation in
America Before the Second World War(Baltimore: Johns Hopkiris University Press, 1995).
' Henry K Beecher, "Ethics and Clinical Research" (1966) 274 New Eng. J. Med. 1354 at
1356.
61 See Ruth Faden & Thomas L. Beauchamp, A History and Theory of Informed Consent
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), especially c. 2 and c. 3.
62 President's Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments, "Government
Standards for Human Experiments: The 1960s and 1970s" in Human Radiation Experiments, supra
note 59, 97 ["Government Standards"].
63 Ibid. at 100.
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each experiment. The directive was vague both as to what would count
as "independent review," and as to the standards for assessing the
adequacy of consent procedures and the acceptability of risk-benefit
profiles. Random audits revealed widespread non-compliance.' 4
The current institutional review system did not emerge until two
further widely publicized research scandals came to light. The first of
the two infamous studies was conducted over a period of more than
fifteen years at the Willowbrook State School for the Retarded in New
York. Incoming residents of the school (most suffering from severe
mental retardation) were admitted on the condition that their guardians
consent to their enrolment in the study. Each child was injected with a
mild dose of hepatitis to help discover a prophylaxis. The second study,
conducted by physicians from the Public Health Service over forty years,
involved four hundred African-American men from Tuskegee,
Alabama. The men were afflicted with syphilis and over the course of
the study were observed, but not treated, so that scientists could trace
the natural history of the disease." Aside from being denied penicillin
when it became available, the subjects were not informed of their illness,
and were misled as to the purpose of the examinations and invasive
interventions they were asked to accept.66 Over the course of the study
approximately twenty-eight men died, and one hundred became blind
and insane as a result of untreated syphilis. 67
Unsurprisingly, the Tuskegee study made front-page news. The
U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare (DHEW) responded
immediately by establishing an advisory panel to investigate the
adequacy of its protections for human research subjects. The final
report of the panel concluded that existing protections were inadequate,
and argued that there was need for "prior and ongoing review" of
human subjects research. 68 Most importantly, the panel advised
Congress to establish "a permanent body with the authority to regulate
64 Ibid. at 101.
' James H. Jones, Bad Blood The Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment (New York: Free Press,
1993) at 5. See also Allan M. Brandt, "Racism and Research: The Case of the Tuskegee Syphilis
Study" (1978) 8 Hastings Center Rep. 21.
'Jones, ibid. at 7-11.
67 Ibid. at 13.
'Jay Katz, "Concurring Opinion" in U.S., Department of Health, Education and Welfare,
Final Report of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study Ad Hoc Panel (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1973) 14 at 21-22.
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at least all federally supported research involving human subjects."69 In
1973, Senator Edward Kennedy successfully introduced the National
Research Act, which provided that the DHEW would establish regulatory
protections for human subjects, and a national commission (the latter
was eventually named the National Commission for the Protection for
Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioural Research).70 The DHEW
issued its regulations in 1974, ushering the institutional review system
into existence by requiring each institution receiving federal funding to
establish an institutional review board, and by establishing detailed
substantive and procedural norms to be followed and enforced by IRBS. 7
Over the course of the past thirty years, the regulatory system in
the United States has not remained static. But, more recent
controversies-including notably those surrounding revelations about
the U.S. government's secret Cold War radiation experiments, 72 and the
widely publicized death of eighteen-year-old Jesse Gelsinger in a gene
therapy trial73-failed to yield the far-reaching change brought by earlier
controversies. Rather, regulatory change has been relatively incremental
in nature and limited in scope. Pressure for major systemic reform is
instead coming from other sources.
B. Recent calls for regulatory reform
While there has been a steady flow of reports recommending the
reform of institutional74 and federal75 review structures in the United
69 Ibid. at 23.
o "Government Standards" in Human Radiation Experiments, supra note 59, 97 at 103.
Over the course of the 1970s, the National Commission issued seventeen voluminous reports that
would have considerable impact on the structure and content of federal regulations.
' Institutional research ethics review was not carried out in Canada in a systematic way
until the Medical Research Council of Canada mandated it for institutions receiving MRC funding.
Medical Research Council of Canada, Guidelines on Research In volving Human Subjects (Ottawa:
Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1987). The Canadian ethics policy was not, and still is not,
legislated as it is in the United States.
72 Jonathan D. Moreno, Undue Risk Secret State Experiments on Humans (New York:
Routledge, 2001).
73 Paul Gelsinger, "Jesse's Intent" (2002) 179 Bull. Med. Ethics 13.
4 Among Canadian reports, see the following: Law Reform Commission of Canada,
Working Paper 61: Biomedical Experimentation with Human Beings (Ottawa: Law Reform
Commission of Canada, 1989); Law Reform Commission of Canada, Toward a Canadian National
Bioethics Council (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1990). Among American reports,
see the following: President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and
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States and Canada from the 1970s through the mid 1990s, the last seven
to eight years have seen a veritable throng of such reports. These reform
movements differ from developments giving rise to the federal and
institutional review structures because they have been primarily
generated by "inside" parties in an environment generally devoid of
public scandal. Reports recommending reform of the institutional
review system have emerged almost biannually in the United States for
the past decade, generated in large part by government inspection
agencies and by advisory bodies composed of academic experts in
bioethics. 76 Though fewer in number and more modest in scope, similar
reports are beginning to emerge and attract attention in Canada.
Recommendations for reform of the federal review structure have come
about in a different way. In the United States, much of the pressure for
reform comes from the steady lobbying efforts of patient advocacy
groups and industry. In Canada, these interest groups have also been
vocal. Given the sheer volume of American reports and the present
uncertainties concerning their impact on policy reform,77 the discussion
Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Protecting Human Subjects: The Adequacy and Uniformity
of Federal Rules and Their Implementation (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981);
Office of Technology Assessment, Biomedical Ethics in U.S. Policy (Washington: U.S. Congress,
1993).
' Among the Canadian reports are the following: The Report of the Commission of
Inquiry on the Pharmaceutical Industry by Harry C. Eastman (Ottawa: Supply and Services
Canada, 1985); Pre-market Clearance of Drug Products. Technical Report No. 4 Program
Evaluation Study of the Drug Safety Ouality and Efficacy Program by R.E. Overstreet et al.
(Ottawa: Health and Welfare Canada, 1989); and Working in Partnerships ... Drug Review for the
Future by D. Gagnon (Ottawa: Health and Welfare Canada, 1992).
6 See e.g. Institute of Medicine, Responsible Researcr- A Systems Approach to Protecting
Research Participants (Washington: National Academies Press, 2003); National Bioethics Advisory
Commission (NBAC), Ethical and Policy Issues in Research Involving Human Participants
(Bethesda: NBAC, 2001); Office of Inspector General, Institutional Review Boards. Their Role in
Reviewing Approved Research (Washington: Department of Health and Human Services, 1998);
Office of Inspector General, Institutional Review Boards. Promising Approaches (Washington:
Department of Health and Human Services, 1998); Office of Inspector General, Institutional
Review Boards The Emergence of Independent Boards (Washington: Department of Health and
Human Services, 1998); and Office of Inspector General, Institutional Review Boards. A Time for
Reform (Washington: Department of Health and Human Services, 1998).
Some of the sweeping recommendations for reform advanced by NBAC were reflected in
a draft senate bill introduced by Senator Edward Kennedy in 2002: Research Revitalization Act of
2002, 107th Cong., 1st sess. (2002) [Discussion Draft. But the status of the bill and background
recommendations has been in limbo subsequent to NBAC's dissolution and the controversial
installation of the current President's Council on Bioethics by President George W. Bush. See Eric
M. Meslin & Harold T. Shapiro, "Some Initial Reflections on NBAC" (2002) 12 Kennedy Inst.
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below will review and assess only the most important recommendations
for reform that have emerged in Canada.
1. Calls for reform of institutional review
Released in 2000, the McDonald Report to the Law
Commission of Canada is the most recent, and thus far the most
important, call for reform of the Canadian system for institutional
review.78 Containing analyses by leading Canadian figures in health law
and policy and bioethics, the McDonald Report identifies a number of
significant weaknesses in the Canadian system, and advances several
recommendations for reform.
By far the most prominent recommendation of the McDonald
Report is for national coordination and oversight of the institutional
review system. One of its key findings was. that "Canada's complex,
decentralised, multisourced arrangements for governing HRIHS [Health
Research Involving Human Subjects] pose major ethical challenges in
terms of consistency, transparency and accountability."79 The argument
underlying the recommendation is that there is no way of ensuring
uniformly high quality REB review, in accordance with existing
regulation and policy, where national coordination and oversight are
lacking. National standards for accreditation and education require a
national agency to promulgate and enforce these standards. Adequate
enforcement of Canadian research policy by REBS cannot be assured
unless some entity is responsible for auditing reviews. Resource-related
problems are often too large, far-reaching, and expensive to be managed
at the institutional level. The coherent development of research ethics
policy and the effective resolution of interpretation and implementation
problems require coordination.
Ethics J. 95; Jonathan D. Moreno, "The Brief Career of a Government Advisory Committee: One
Member's Perspective" (2002) 2 Am. J. Bioethics 4; David Michaels et al., "Advice Without
Dissent" (2002) 298 Science 703; and Eugene Russo, "Advice Fit for a President: New Bioethics
Council Faces Tough Challenges, Harsh Criticism" (2002) 16 The Scientist 22. For an intriguing
discussion of priorities for reform of the institutional review structure in the United States, see
Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al., "Oversight of Human Participants Research: Identifying Problems to
Evaluate Reform Proposals" (2004) 141 Ann. Intern. Med. 282.
I Michael McDonald et al., The Governance of Health Research Involving Human
Subjects (Ottawa: Law Commission of Canada, 2000) [McDonald Report].
9 Ibid. at vii.
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While the need for national coordination and oversight was the
dominant and recurring theme, the McDonald Report advanced other
important recommendations. The report advocated greater investment
in resources for REBs, in response to the concern that REBs do not have
adequate financial and human resources to rigorously protect human
subjects."0 REBS need greater financial resources to sponsor educational
programs, compensate ad hoc consultants, and generally cover
mounting administrative costs. Lack of human resources-principally
science experts-also represents a concern, inasmuch as the sound
assessment of many substantive conditions for the approval of research
(e.g. risk/benefit assessment, adequacy of inclusion and exclusion
criteria, and determination of scientific value and validity) requires
scientific expertise. Based on interviews with REB members across
Canada, the McDonald Report concluded:
The need for an infusion of resources cannot be overstated. At the various sites across
the country the story is the same: overburdened REB members are stretched to the
breaking point ... As the work becomes increasingly complicated with globalization,
[advances in] technology and commercialization, REBs are struggling to find committee
chairs or even members.
8
'
The McDonald Report's second most important
recommendation proposed a coordinated effort to ensure the
independence of REBS. Until recently, it has been tacitly accepted that
the benefits of local review outweigh any possible negative effects owing
to potential conflicts of interest. 2 The McDonald Report found that the
tacit assumption no longer holds due to new financial pressures placed
upon institutions and researchers at a time when industry investment in
research is proportionally high. Indeed, the report concluded that
"those with vested interests in its outcomes - researchers, research
80 For details of one Canadian REB's experience, see Jane McCusker et al., "Monitoring
Clinical Research: Report of One Hospital's Experience" (2001) 164 Can. Med. Assoc. J. 1321.
81 McDonald Report, supra note 78 at xii.
82The earliest and still best arguments in favour of local review are found in U.S., National
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research,
Institutional Review Boards. Report and Recommendations (Washington: Department of Health,
Education and Welfare, 1978). Scholars in Canada and the United States are increasingly
recommending a shift to state/provincial or regional review, in large part because of concerns
regarding REB independence. The most highly developed arguments are advanced in Anne Wood,
Christine Grady & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, "The Crisis in Human Participants Research: Identifying
the Problems and Proposing Solutions," online: The President's Council on Bioethics
< http://www.bioethics.gov/background/emanuelpaper.html >.
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institutions and research sponsors - dominate the research process and
its governance." 3 The issue of REB independence is particularly notable
in Canada because "we lack the strong counterbalance provided in the
US by independent federal governance of research ethics approval and
by the significant level of research support provided by NIH and other
US agencies.,1
4
Though the McDonald Report set them aside,85 important
questions have been raised by scholars about the operation of for-profit
REBS in Canada and the United States.86 As Trudo Lemmens and
Benjamin Freedman note, for-profit REBS suffer from an inherent
conflict of interest that is inconsistent with their public mandate; their
clients-predominantly members of the pharmaceuticals industry-have
a clear vested interest in securing ethics approval. The McDonald
Report recommended that stakeholders, including federal and
provincial governments, "take greater steps ... to insulate REBs and
parallel bodies from pressures that potentially compromise their
independence."" Given the increasing reliance on for-profit REBS in the
review of community-based studies, the. report ought to have
recommended that they be barred or made subject to specific
regulation.
That being said, the overall message of the McDonald Report is
important and strikingly clear: confidence in the ability of REBS to
protect the rights and welfare of research subjects will only come with
cooperative government oversight, investment, and participation in the
institutional review system. The influence of that unalloyed message is
reflected in the adoption of many of the McDonald Report
recommendations in the final report of the Senate Standing Committee
83 McDonald Report, supra note 78 at xi.
8 Ibid. at xii. For an account of how the University of Toronto has confronted these and
other challenges in the absence of a strong national oversight system, see C. David Naylor and The
Research Committee and Clinical Study Agreements Working Group of the Toronto Academic
Health Science Council, "Early Toronto Experience with New Standards for Industry-Sponsored
Clinical Research: A Progress Report" (2002) 166 Can. Med. Assoc. J. 453.
s McDonald Report, supra note 78 at 10.
86 Trudo Lemmens & Benjamin Freedman, "Ethics Review for Sale? Conflict of Interest
and Commercial Research Ethics Review Boards" (2000) 78 Milbank Q. 547; Trudo Lemmens &
Alison Thompson, "Noninstitutional Commercial Review Boards in North America: A Critical
Appraisal and Comparison with IRBs" (2001) 23 IRB: Rev. Hum. Subj. Res.. 1.
8 McDonald Report, supra note 78 at 311.
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on Social Affairs, Science and Technology (the Kirby Report"S), and in
recent efforts by Health Canada to investigate reform options.
The Kirby Report addressed issues relating to the protection of
human subjects in its chapter on health research. There, it noted that
generally Canadian REBS "seem to operate to a high standard," but that
"serious gaps" in the Canadian institutional review system have come to
light.8 9 Among these, the report mentioned the fact that Canada has "no
oversight mechanism to ensure compliance" with existing research
ethics policies.9" It further noted that there are "no standard training
requirements for Canadian REB members," and that there is "no process
of certification [or] accreditation" of REBs and REB members.91 The
Kirby Report acknowledged concerns about the independence of REBs,
stating that it is essential that they "operate free from institutional or
researcher pressures."" Finally, it also recognized that there is a "basic
need for more resources" for REBS. 9 3
On the basis of these findings, the Kirby Report recommended
that Health Canada begin the collaborative development of "a joint
governance system for health research involving human subjects for all
research that the federal government performs, that it funds, and that it
uses in its regulatory activities.394 It added further that the development
of this system should be guided by a set of priorities. These include
establishing national, updated standards for the approval of research;
providing for education and certification of REB members; and
88 The Senate Standing Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology, Chapter 12
"Nurturing Excellence in Canadian Health Research" in The Health of Canadians- The Federal
Role- Final Report, Volume Six Recommendations for Reform (Ottawa: October 2002) 201.
89 Ibid at 224.
9o Ibid.
91 Ibid. at 225.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid. at 226. Note that this recommendation in effect calls for national coordination and
oversight to meet the gaps found in the system, but it does not specifically recommend legislation,
nor does it call for an extension of the requirement for REB review to all privately sponsored
research. It is also noteworthy that the recommendation applies only to governance of health
research. If acted upon only in respect of health research, important questions as to the governance
of other forms of human subjects research (now covered, along with health research, by the Tri-
Council Policy Statement, infra note 164) will need to be addressed.
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establishing an accreditation system for REBS that is "at arm's length
from government, but clearly accountable to government."95
The ultimate impact of the recommendations advanced by the
McDonald Report, and affirmed in the Kirby Report, is not yet clear.96
There were some early signs of movement within the. federal
government Health Canada recognized many of the flaws in the
Canadian system, promised improvements, and engaged in widespread
consultation to determine Canadian priorities for reform.97 The promise
of improvement also received official government recognition in a
throne speech delivered by former governor general Adrienne Clarkson
in 2002.98 The mounting pressure for regulatory reform might have
gained momentum under the government's "Smart Regulation"
initiative: a resulting consultation draft championed a number of themes
that resonate with calls for reform of the governance system in
Canada.99  In particular, commitments to transparency, public
accountability, and policy coherence seem to herald change to the
existing "complex, decentralised, multisourced arrangements for
governing HRIHS"-a system the McDonald Report rightly criticized as
posing "major ethical challenges in terms of consistency, transparency
and accountability.""1 ' However, former prime minister Paul Martin
failed to act on the promise contained within the throne speech. This
may not be surprising given that he championed increased industry
95 Ibid. at 227.
'Perhaps this is in part because the federal government is still deliberating the nature and
significance of constitutional obstacles to legislated reform. See Jennifer Llewellyn, Jocelyn Downie
& Robert Holmes, "Protecting Human Research Subjects: A Jurisdictional Analysis" (2003) (Sp.
Ed.) Health L.J. 207; Trudo Lemmens, "Federal Regulation of REB Review of Clinical Trials: A
Modest But Easy Step Towards an Accountable REB Review Structure in Canada'.' (2005) 13
Health L. Rev. 39 at 45-47.
" Health Canada, Towards a National System of Oversight for the Governance of
Research Involving Humans (Discussion Workbook) (Ottawa: Health Canada, 2002). Though, as
shall be discussed below, it appears that Health Canada's interest in improving governance is as
much a reflection of its recognition of potential liability in the wake of a 1999 audit by the auditor
general as anything else. See infra note 131.
9Peter Calamai, "Human Research Rules Promised" Toronto Star(1 October 2002) A8.
Government of Canada, Consultation Document- Government Directive on Regulating
(Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2005).
1o0 Ibid. at vii.
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investment in Canada through the commercialization of basic science." 1
Indeed, some interpreted the "Smart Regulation" initiative as
fundamentally pro-industry and anti-regulation in motivation.12 If this
interpretation is correct, it could be predicted that early signs of
movement within Health Canada have ceased. Though the Conservative
Party policy declaration suggests more of the same, highlighted as it is
by pro-industry promises of tax credits" 3 and faster drug approvals, it
remains to be seen what the government of Prime Minister Stephen
Harper will do." One can only hope that the urgent need of research
subjects for better regulatory oversight will not be sacrificed at the altar
of industry profit.
2. Calls for reform of federal review
The two most prominent groups pushing for reform of federal
processes in the recent past have been the pharmaceutical industry and
patient advocacy organizations. Both are well organized, experienced in
lobbying, and have a proven track record of bringing their respective
agendas to bear on pharmaceuticals' policy development. °5
The demands for policy reform by patient advocacy groups have
been less visible once important victories were won, first in the United
States in the late 1980s and soon thereafter in Canada, by groups
'ol Drew Fagan, "The Vision of Paul Martin, Science Geek" The Globe and Mail (24
March 2004) Al; David Spurgeon, "Canadian Prime Minister Makes Science a Priority" (2004) 427
Nature 91.
102 Barbara Sibbald, "Ottawa to Combine Smart Regulation and Precaution" (2005) 172
Can. Med. Assoc. J. 1544; Janice Graham, "Smart Regulation: Will the Government's Strategy
Work?" (2005) 173 Can. Med. Assoc. J. 1469.
103 Conservative Party of Canada, Policy Declaration (19 March 2005) at 11, online:
< http://www.conservative.ca/media/20050319-POLICYper cent20DECLARATION.pdf>.
104 Ibid. at 20.
105 On industry influence, see generally Relman & Angell, supra note 9; Joel Lexchin,
"Drug Makers and Drug Regulators: Too Close for Comfort. A Study of the Canadian Situation"
(1990) 31 Soc. Sci. Med. 1257; and Elizabeth R. Glod6, "Advising Under the Influence? Conflicts
of Interest Among FDA Advisory Committee Members" (2002) 57 Food & Drug L.J. 293. On the
influence of patient interest groups, particularly HIV/AIDS advocacy groups, see Edgar & Rothman,
supra note 45; Ronald Podraza, "The FDA's Response to AIDS: Paradigm Shift in New Drug Policy"
(1993) 48 Food & Drug L.J. 351; Mary M. Dunbar, "Shaking Up the Status Quo: How AIDS
Activists Have Challenged Drug Development and Approval Procedures' (1991) 46 Food Drug
Cosm. L.J. 673.
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representing HIV/AIDS patients."6 In a strange alliance, the voices of the
HIV/AIDS advocacy groups joined with those of industry representatives
to decry delays in drug approval times. 1°7 Though the resulting policy
changes fell -short of industry aspirations, they were wide-ranging and
did much to expedite access to promising new treatments. 8 Perhaps the
most important policy development in Canada was the initiation of the
Special Access Program, through which patients with serious or life-
threatening conditions (for whom conventional treatments have failed)
can, through their physician, gain access to drugs not approved for sale
in Canada." 9 The establishment of priority review, or fast-tracking of
potentially life-saving drugs to reduce the targeted review time from 300
days to 180 days, represents another important development.' 0
Similarly, the "Notice of Compliance with Conditions" policy is critical,
because it allows for the marketing of potentially life-saving drugs on
'0 See Benjamin Freedman and the McGill/Boston Research Group, "Nonvalidated
Therapies and HIV Disease" (1989) 19 Hastings Center Rep. 14; David A. Salisbury & Martin T.
Schecter, "AIDS Trials, Civil Liberties and the Social Control of Therapy: Should We Embrace New
Drugs With Open Arms? (1990) 142 Can. Med. Assoc. J. 1057; and Benjamin Freedman,
"Suspended Judgment: AIDS and the Ethics of Clinical Trials: Learning the Right Lessons" (1992)
13 Control. Clin. Trials 1.
'See Edgar & Rothman, supra note 45.
o For a more thorough discussion, see Leah E. Hutt, "Freebies for Subject 641: A
Discussion of the Ethical Prospect of Providing Drug-Trial Subjects with Post Trial Access to the
Drug Tested - A Canadian Perspective" (1998) 6 Health L.J. 169.
'o Therapeutic Products Directorate, Special Access Programme Fact Sheet (Ottawa:
Health Canada, 2002). For details on the involvement of Canadian HIV/AIDS activist groups, see
Trudo Lemmens, "Compassionate Access to Investigational Therapies" (1996) 3:1 Can. HIV/AIDS
Pol'y & L. Rev. 41; Benjamin Freedman, "Compassionate Access to Experimental Drugs and
Catastrophic Rights" (1996) 3:1 Can. HIV/AIDS Pol'y & L. Rev 44; Maggie Atkinson, "A
Response to the Parliamentary Sub-Committee's Report and Recommendations" (1997) 3:2-3 Can.
HIV/AIDS Pol'y & L. Rev.; and Trudo Lemmens, "A Response to the Parliamentary Sub-
Committee's Report and Recommendations on Compassionate Access to Experimental Drugs of
the Parliamentary Subcommittee on HIV/AIDS" (1997) 3:2-3 Can. HIV/AIDS Pol'y & L. Rev. 40.
Note that the Special Access Program policy may not be viewed favourably by the pharmaceuticals
industry to the extent that it may reduce the incentive for the TPD to conduct more efficient
approvals.
.10 Therapeutic Products Directorate, Priority Review of Drug Submissions (Ottawa:
Health Canada, 2002) at 2. Note that these review times are targets, and are reportedly rarely met.
Furthermore, the criteria for priority review are vague.
[VOL. 44, NO. 4
2006] Clinical Drug Trials 703
the condition that the manufacturer supply additional evidence of the
efficacy of the drug within a given time frame."'
While patient advocacy groups have campaigned for, and won,
policies providing improved access to new treatments, industry lobbying
efforts have been, and continue to be, focused on the need for improved
"efficiency" in the federal approval process. When the pharmaceutical
industry demands "improved efficiency," it hopes to achieve shorter
review times. Delay, for whatever reason, is costly, and for that reason
industry representatives continue to press for shortened review times. " '
The position advanced by Rx&D in a 2002 policy report is typical. 3 The
Rx&D report warned that Canada stands to lose its place among world
leaders in pharmaceuticals research if Canadian policies, including those
on drug approval, are not "improved." Taking on the mantle of
improving patient access, it suggested that "formidable delays and
barriers to patient's access to innovative therapies ... stand out as
impediments to R&D investment growth."'"4 The report claims that the
"time taken for the review of drug submissions is unnecessarily lengthy"
and promises that "timely approvals would encourage more research to
be undertaken in this country.""1 5 It emphasized these complaints by
raising the issue of international competitiveness, suggesting that a "key
factor" in the consolidation of American dominance in pharmaceuticals
research and development is the "streamlining of the FDA'S review and
approval procedures."" 6 Rx&D also cleverly suggested that it should be
invited by government into the policy development process, in doing so
noting that "other jurisdictions have already undertaken joint industry-
government consultations that yielded recommendations and detailed
action plans aimed at enhancing their global competitiveness in
- Therapeutic Products Directorate, Notice of Compliance with Conditions: Revised
Policy (Ottawa: Health Canada, 2002). Unfortunately, these conditions are not made public, so
there is no way to determine whether manufacturers are complying with them.
112 See Lars Noah, "Administrative Arm Twisting in the Shadow of Congressional
Delegations of Authority" (1997) Wis. L. Rev. 873.
" Canada's Research-Based Pharmaceutical Companies, Improving Health Through
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pharmaceuticals."" 7 In the interim, the Rx&D report outlined specific
policy recommendations that advance its. members' agenda, which
include the establishment of review time targets; the direction of
increased government resources to improved review "efficiency"; and
the pursuit of cooperative agreements with other countries that would
enable the TPD to "take much better advantage of the scientific
evaluation" carried out by its counterparts."u
Although it does not appear that the government responded
publicly to the Rx&D report, years of industry pressure seem to have
secured a'number of policy changes within the TPD. Due to the cutback
in federal appropriations in the early to mid 1990s, between 1994 and
1998 the TPD introduced a government-wide cost-recovery program,
which requires manufacturers to pay fees ranging from $250 through
$300,000 per product submitted for review." 9 This program came with a
commitment from Health Canada that the funds would be allocated in
part to improving the efficiency of the review process. 12 According to
Joel Lexchin,"2 this commitment increased the already considerable
leverage of the industry. The passing of the User Fees Ac' 22 in 2004
only strengthened perceptions of industry influence. 23 Several aspects of
the bill give the pharmaceutical industry considerable influence by
establishing government performance measures tied to the payment of
user fees.
The TPD had also, for some time prior to the Rx&D report, been
engaged in international collaborative efforts designed to reduce review
times. 124 The initiatives undertaken by the TPD include its pursuit of
Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRA) with counterpart agencies in
other countries. MRAs provide that each signatory country will
"17Ibid at 2.
"1 Ibid. at 13.
tt Therapeutic Products Directorate, Health Canada, Cost Recovery Fact Sheet (Ottawa:
Health Canada, 2001).
oImproving Health, supra note 113 at 11.
121 Joel Lexchin, "Secrecy and the Health Protection Branch" (1998) 159 Can. Med. Assoc.
J. 481 at 483 [Lexchin, "Secrecy"]. Relman & Angell make the same claim about the FDA's
introduction of review fees in 1992: supra note 9 at 39.
122 User Fees Act, R.S.C. 2004, c. 6.
'Joel Lexchin, "New Directions in Drug Approval" (2004) 171 Can. Med. Assoc. J. 229.
124 International Policy Division, Therapeutic Products Programme's International Strategy
(Ottawa: Health Canada, 1999).
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recognize the. other's testing and inspections. Canada has, to date,
ratified MRAs with the European Community and Switzerland,
Australia, and the European Economic Area (Norway, Liechtenstein,
and Iceland). Some scholars view the MRAs as particularly striking,
potentially risky, 2 and arguably undemocratic1"6 concessions to industry
pressures to minimize regulatory scrutiny and oversight of new
therapeutic products. These are among the many concerns associated
with Canada's participation in the International Conference on
Harmonization (ICH),' 2 7 which has recently been endorsed in strong
terms by the External Advisory Committee on Smart Regulation."
MRAs implicitly cede control over the establishment and enforcement of
regulatory standards for the safety and efficacy of therapeutic products.
Such concessions are inseparable from broader ICH-led efforts to
harmonize international standards and processes for drug approval.
These efforts are especially troubling because ICH proceedings are
dominated by regulatory agencies and pharmaceutical industry
associations to the exclusion of advocacy groups, the medical profession,
and the lay public. 29
In addition to calls for reform advanced, by patient advocacy
groups, industry representatives, and others, 3' the TPD has also been
' MRAs are potentially risky to the extent that multiple reviews are more likely to uncover
flaws in the evidence submitted in support of manufacturers' claims. See Robyn Lim,
"Rapacuronium: Premarket Drug Evaluation Can Be Very Effective for the Identification of Drug
Risks" (2003) 96 Anesth. Analg. 631.
126 MRAS imperil democratic values to the extent that the foreign agencies whose
assessments Canada will accept are not accountable to the Canadian public.
"27 For more, see John Abraham, "International Harmonisation of Pharmaceuticals: Key
Issues of Concern for Public Health," online: Women and Health Protection <http:/www.whp-
apsf.ca/en/documents/harmon.html> [Abraham, "International Harmonisation"]. See also John
Abraham, "Pharmaceuticals, the State and the Global Harmonisation Process" (2004) 28 Austr.
Health Rev. 150.
'z External Advisory Committee on Smart Regulation, Smart Regulatior. A Regulatory
Strategy for Canada - Report to the Government of Canada (Ottawa: External Advisory
Committee on Smart Regulation, 2004): 79-84, online: Privy Council Office <http:/www.pco-
bcp.gc.ca/smartreg-regint/en/08/rpt-fnl.pdf>.
'Abraham, "International Harmonisation," supra note 127.
o Most notably, Joel Lexchin, a Canadian physician who has provided important sustained
public criticism of federal drug approval standards and process. See Lexchin, supra notes 46, 105,
121 and 123; Joel Lexchin, "Drug Withdrawals from the Canadian Market for Safety Reasons,
1963-2004" (2005) 172 Can. Med. Assoc. J. 765; Joel Lexchin & Barbara Mintzes, "Transparency in
Drug Regulation: Mirage or Oasis?" (2004) 171 Can. Med. Assoc. J. 1363; and Joel Lexchin, "The
Relationship Between Pharmaceutical Regulation and Inappropriate Prescribing: the Case of
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forced to respond to criticism by the auditor general of Canada (AG).'
In 1999, the AG audited a clinical trial of an anti-malarial drug
(mefloquine), which was sponsored by Health Canada and the
Department of National Defence. The audit found that the subjects in
the trial, who were members of the Canadian Armed Forces, had not
provided written consent, and that there was no ongoing monitoring of
the safety and efficacy of the treatment provided over the course of the
trial. The AG found Health Canada culpable: "Once Health Canada
approved the conditions for the clinical trial of the drug, it made no
attempt to monitor the study to ensure that the trial was adhering to the
protocol with its reporting requirements and procedures to protect
patients' well-being.".132 The AG faulted Health Canada for its failure to
establish "procedures for monitoring the conduct of these studies." '133
The audit recommended that Health Canada develop and implement
monitoring procedures immediately, noting that under the Food and
Drug Regulations,'34 "Health Canada has the responsibility to review
and approve the trial design and protocol."
' 13 5
This call for reform marks a turning point of considerable
importance, both because of its direct impact on policy and because it
unequivocally states that the federal government is responsible for a
more active role in the approval and oversight of clinical trials.'36 This
public interest mandate had previously been left to REBS, researchers,
and research sponsors. Indeed, Health Canada officially responded to
the audit by disowning responsibility, claiming it "rests with the sponsor
of the clinical trial ... as well as associated institutional research ethics
Psychotropic Drugs in Canada During the 1960s and Early 1970s" (1998) 11 Int'l J. Risk & Safety
Med. 49.
131 Office of the Auditor General, National Defence and Heafth Canada: Non-Compliance
With Conditions and Inadequate Montoring With Respect to the Pre-licensing Use of an Anti-
Malarial Drug (Ottawa: Office of the Auditor General, 1999), online: <http://www.oag-
bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/9900ce.html >.
132 Ibid.
* Ibid. at para. 14.
t Food and Drugs Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-27.
'
3 3 Supra note 131 at para. 18.
1 For an interesting discussion of potential Crown liability in the oversight of clinical
trials, see Sana Halwani, "Her Majesty's Research Subjects: Liability of the Crown in Research
Involving Humans" in Trudo Lemmens & Duff Waring, eds., Law and Ethics in Biomedical
Research (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2006).
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boards.' 37 Health Canada soon reversed course. The TPD drafted an
inspection strategy for random auditing of ongoing clinical trials in
August 2001 and implemented a final policy in January 2002.138 The
policy anticipates the annual inspection of 2-per cent of all clinical trial
sites, "'39 and has resulted in two reports revealing important research
ethics deficiencies. 40 Most significantly, in 2001, Health Canada
promulgated revised clinical trial regulations, which, until the 2001
revision, had been essentially unchanged since instituted in the 1960s.".'
Highlights of the revised regulations include improved
requirements relating to federal approval and oversight of clinical
trials, 42 provisions for the inspection/monitoring system, and the clear
grant of authority to Health Canada to deny approval to or terminate
the conduct of clinical trials. The regulations also require that sponsors
of clinical trials obtain REB approval.'43 Most telling about the current
state of affairs, however, are the vague remarks about REBs in the
accompanying Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement. These remarks
indicate that, despite its recognition of the role of REB review, the
federal government is still uncertain of its ability to rely on REBs and of
the relationship between federal and institutional levels of review.
Consider, for instance, that while the new regulations "recognise the
important role played by REBS in their oversight of the conduct of
clinical trials,"'144 the statement repeats familiar concerns about REB
"3 Office of the Auditor General, supra note 131 at para. 18
'-~ Inspection Strategy, supra note 19.
1-9 Ibid. at 6.
" Health Products and Food Branch Inspectorate, Summary Report of the Inspections of
Clinical Trials Conducted Under the Voluntary Phase (Ottawa: Health Canada, 2003), online:
<http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/alt-formats/hpfb-dgpsa/pdf/compli-conform/gcp-insp-rep-
rap bpcinspe.pdf>; Health Products and Food Branch Inspectorate, Summary Report of the
Inspections of Clinical Trials Conducted in 2005 2004 (Ottawa: Health Canada, 2004), online:
<http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/alt-formats/hpfb-dgpsa/pdf/compli-conform/2003-2004-e.pdf>.
14' Regulations, supra note 18.
"4' The changes include detailed provisions for application information, notice of
amendments to study design and protocol, record keeping, and the prompt reporting of adverse
reactions.
"4 Regulations, supra note 18 at para. C.05.006.(1)(c): "[Flor each clinical trial site, the
sponsor has obtained the approval of the research ethics board in respect of the protocol referred
to in paragraph C.05.005(a) and in respect of an informed consent statement referred to in
paragraph C.05.005(b)."
'4 Ibid., Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement at 17.
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review. The most notable concerns are that "at the present time, there is
no accreditation system in Canada for REB,"' 145 that "some Canadian
REBs have limited resources and experience with the review of drug
clinical trials,"' 146 and further, that REBs presently "follow one or a
number of federal or provincial guidelines [with some following] foreign
guidelines., 147  The federal government's uncertainty about its
relationship to REBS is clearly indicated by its suggestion that
"clarifications are required to better define the roles and responsibilities
of the various players in the review of clinical trials.,
148
These developments suggest that Health Canada has realized
that it shares responsibility for the oversight of clinical trials, and
understands the imperative to work more closely with REBS. They also
reveal that Health Canada is troubled by the current state of REB review
and is unsure of the relationship between institutional and federal
review structures. Despite the clear need for coordinated assessment of
REB and TPD review policies and practices, recommendations to date for
reform of federal and institutional review have consistently and without
exception failed to recognize the issue.
Recommendations for reform of the institutional review system,
while calling for national oversight and coordination, have consistently
failed to assess the inadequacies of REB review from a systemic
perspective. The ultimate impact of the pervasive problems in
institutional oversight of clinical trials on the ability of federal officials
to assess the safety and efficacy of therapeutic products remains
unknown. Potential avenues for the coordination of institutional and
federal approval and oversight efforts remain to be explored. To be fair
to those engaged in reform efforts in Canada, it should be noted that
these failings coincide with gaps in the more extensive reform literature
in the United States and in the academic research ethics literature.
Reform efforts focused on federal drug approval and oversight
processes have been no better in this respect. Many of the reforms
adopted to date reflect the respective interests of powerful interest
groups, most notably patient advocacy groups and industry. The former
'5 Ibid. at 4.
'4Ibid at 4, 12, and 14.
147 Ibid. at 18.
143 Ibid at 11.
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have demanded, and largely won, improved access to new and
experimental treatments. The latter continue to press for shorter review
times. Perhaps unsurprisingly, in consideration of their respective
agendas, neither has called for the coordination of institutional and
federal approval and oversight processes. The AG's audit has stimulated
important policy development as well as reflection within the federal
government on the relationship between federal and REB review. These
developments, however, have not attracted mention, let alone sustained
reflection in the most recent examination of the federal drug approval
process-namely, that conducted by the Romanow Commission. The
Romanow report does advance some progressive recommendations for
reform of the national approval of pharmaceuticals, 49 but it simply does
not recognize the role of the federal government and REBS in overseeing
the very clinical trials that form the evidentiary basis of the approval
process. This is peculiar, given that the Romanow Commission
otherwise demonstrated great sensitivity to the importance of securing
the informational and evidentiary foundations of health care delivery.15
IV. EXPLORING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
INSTITUTIONAL AND FEDERAL REVIEW
To date, recommended reforms for the regulatory oversight of
pharmaceuticals development-whether focused on institutional or
federal bodies-have consistently failed to adopt a systemic perspective.
This is despite the significant outstanding questions about the
relationship between federal and institutional approval and the
140 These include the establishment of a national drug agency, independent from industry
and government, and recommendations that the national approval process include assessment of
the comparative safety.and efficacy of new and standard treatments; the devotion of more resources
to reduction of review delays; and that the national authority take on an expanded role in
dissemination of "objective and reliable knowledge" about pharmaceuticals to health professionals
and the public. Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada, "Chapter 9 - Prescription
Drugs" in Building on Values: The Future of Health Care in Canada, Final Report (November
2002) 189 at 199-205.
150 "Chapter 3 - Information, Evidence and Ideas" in Commission on the Future of Health
Care in Canada, ibid., 75. It was this sensibility that motivated the commission's strong
recommendation in this chapter (ibid. at 77-82) for the establishment of electronic personal health
records. Personal health records are important, but they -are just one significant part of the
information armamentarium that physicians must bring to bear in caring for patients. Equally, if not
more significant, is the scientific evidence in support of treatment alternatives (e.g. that provided by
clinical trials).
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oversight of clinical trials, and the ultimate impact of such oversight on
the final federal reviews for marketing approval.
This section reviews the relationship between the assessments
conducted by REBs and the TPD, and indicates the importance, and
promise of future coordination of REB and TPD review, arguing that
REBs and the TPD can work better by working together. Though future
reform efforts should consider the potential for coordination more
widely, the illustration provided here focuses on the risk assessment and
evaluation functions carried out by REBs in the approval and oversight
of clinical trials, and by the TPD in conducting its reviews for marketing
approval.
A. Risk assessment and evaluation: a case study
1. Risk assessment and evaluation by the TPD
The principal mandate of the TPD is the evaluation of the safety
and efficacy of therapeutic products.151 It fulfils its mandate in large part
by conducting detailed scientific risk-benefit assessments of new
therapeutic products.152 Traditionally, the interests protected by the TPD
are the interests of the Canadian public. The TPD protects the welfare
interests of Canadians by ensuring that we consume products for which
there is sound, reliable evidence of acceptable levels of safety and
therapeutic benefit. In working to fulfil its mandate, the TPD must
engage in a delicate balancing act. It must release a product to market
only when the evidence shows that the risks the product poses are
acceptably offset by its benefits. At the same time, it must not unduly
delay products of considerable benefit from reaching Canadians in need
of them.
The TPD'S risk-benefit assessment shapes its performance of its
particular responsibilities. Most evidently, the assessment provides the
"' Of course, in the wake of the AG's audit, the TPD has also accepted responsibility for
overseeing the conduct of clinical trials through inspections. But the nature of the risk-benefit
assessment to be conducted in these inspections, and the relationship between these inspections
and those conducted by REBs, remains unclear. Recognition of this "new" responsibility opens up
the very grey zone of overlapping REB-TPD responsibility that stands in need of exploration and
clarification.
1 See generally Richard A. Merrill, 'Risk-Benefit Decisionmaking by the Food and Drug
Administration" (1977) 45 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 994.
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foundation for its evaluation'53 of the "quality, safety and effectiveness"
of pharmaceutical drugs as part of the Notice of Compliance (NOC)
approval process. It also forms the basis of the TPD's review of the
accuracy of risk-benefit information provided to Canadian consumers
(e.g. in packaging inserts, and, more indirectly, through advertisements
directed at physicians). Risk assessment is also conducted on an ongoing
basis as part of post-marketing surveillance activities conducted by the
Marketed Health Products Directorate in coordination with the TPD
and the Biologics and Genetic Therapies Directorate. On the basis of
adverse event reports received from physicians, the results of Phase IV
clinical trials, or alerts from other countries, the TPD may revise its
assessment of the safety of marketed products and revoke marketing
approval accordingly.
The TPD uses a range of evidence in conducting its risk-benefit
assessment. Much of this evidence comes from materials submitted by
the manufacturer in support of its application for an NOC. An American
commentator suggests that the FDA receives on average 100,000 pages
of supporting material with each submission. 54 The most important
information consists of the results of Phase III clinical trials. Other
important forms of evidence in the supporting materials include the
results of animal studies, Phase I and II clinical trials, the protocol(s)
according to which the clinical trial(s) were conducted, records
(including adverse event reports), information as to the chemical
composition of the compound, and the manufacturer's summary. The
TPD may also conduct its own literature review, searching for results of
clinical trials other than those submitted by manufacturers, such as
interim results from ongoing clinical trials released in peer-reviewed
journals. Another potentially important source of evidence is the "two-
way" alert system the TPD has established with a number of its
counterparts around the world. The alert arrangements are part of the
mutual recognition agreements and memoranda of understanding the
153 As shall be discussed below, there are important policy implications flowing from a basic
distinction between risk assessment and Fisk evaluation. That is, "a fundamental distinction must be
made between measuing risk, an objective but probabilistic pursuit; and Judging the acceptability
of that risk (judging safety), a matter of personal and social value judgment." William W. Lawrence,
Of Acceptable Risk. Science and the Determination of Safety (Los Altos: William Kaufmann,
1976) at 8, cited in Fraiberg & Trebilcock, supra note 52 at 847.
'
4 Dunbar, supra note 105 at 683.
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TPD has entered into under its international strategy.155 They provide
that the signatories will promptly exchange important safety
information. It remains unknown whether the alert system has been
used, and if so, to what extent.
The scrutiny undertaken by the TPD in the course of conducting
its risk-benefit assessment is comprehensive. TPD scientists must
determine whether, taken in sum, the evidence is sufficient to support
manufacturers' claims (e.g. by considering whether the Phase III trials
are sufficiently large or the results sufficiently supportive). They must
also look for flaws in the design of the study that would indicate that the
results are not reliable. Pharmacologists and chemists independently
study the compound and its ingredients to determine whether there are
any concerns with the toxicity of the ingredients, deficiencies in the
manufacturing process, and so on. On the basis of its investigations, the
TPD issues a final risk-benefit assessment. In light of the nature of the
evidence assessed by the TPD, this is an "absolute" risk-benefit
assessment. The evidence generally does not reveal, and the TPD
therefore does not base its approval on, information as to the
comparative safety and efficacy of the new drug as against standard
treatments. Phase III clinical trials, which are the most important source
of information, are most often designed with placebo (inert) rather than
active controls (e.g. standard treatment(s)). As a result, the data is
indicative only of the absolute safety and efficacy of the new drug.156
While the basis and process of the TPD's risk-benefit assessment
activities are fairly transparent, the standards and process according to
which it makes its ultimate risk-benefit evaluation are less clear. The
risk-benefit evaluation is the final determination, based on the
assessment, as to whether the risks and benefits are acceptably balanced.
This is a point of concern, for while risk assessment is widely accepted as
a scientific endeavour (requiring expert scrutiny of complex scientific
' International Policy Division, supra note 124 at 15-21.
156 Other study design constraints (e.g. sample size, exclusion criteria) limit the
generalizability of the results of Phase III trials. Some of these constraints are inevitable while
others are the subject of decision. The latter are implicated in the debate between explanatory and
pragmatic approaches to study design. See Daniel Schwartz & Joseph Lellouch, "Explanatory and
Pragmatic Attitudes in Therapeutic Trials" (1967) 20 J. Chronic Dis. 637; Mike Pringle & Richard
Churchill, "Randomised Controlled Trials in General Practice: Gold or Fool's Gold?" (1995) 311
Brit. Med. J. 1382; and Marshall Godwin etal., "Pragmatic Controlled Trials in Primary Care: The
Struggle Between External and Internal Validity" (2003) 3 BMC Med. Res. Methodol. 28.
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information, and calculation of the probability and magnitude of
possible harms and benefits), it is well established that risk evaluation is
a matter of politics and morals. 157 Fraiberg and Trebilcock, among
others,' note that determination of acceptable risks and benefits is a
value judgment, requiring moral and political deliberation and choice. 59
Where scientists are making both the risk assessment and evaluation
determinations without public input or representation-as they appear
to be doing at the TPD-important questions of democratic legitimacy
ought to be raised and addressed. 60 These questions are arguably more
pressing as the TPD and its counterparts come under increasing pressure
to "privatize" drug approval by contracting it out to external scientists.' t
These scientists are less accountable to the public than government-
employed scientists. More troubling, in view of very pervasive ties
between industry and clinical scientists,162 is the possibility that the
"See Abraham, supra note 53.
l' See e.g. Deborah G. Mayo & Rachelle D. Hollander, eds., Acceptable Evidence.
Science and Values in Risk Management (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); William E.
Hilton, "Risk and Value Judgments" (1992) 3 Risk 37; Carl F. Cranor, "The Normative Nature of
Risk Assessment: Features and Possibilities" (1997) 8 Risk 123; Paul Slovic, "Trust, Emotion, Sex,
Politics, and Science: Surveying the Risk Assessment Battlefield" (1997) U. Chi. Legal F. 59; and
Duff R. Waring & Trudo Lemmens, "Integrating Values in Risk Analysis of Biomedical Research:
The Case for Regulatory and Law Reform" (2004) 54 U.T.L.J. 549.
'
5 9 Fraiberg & Trebilcock, supra note 52 at 857-71.
"a See generally Sheila Jasanoff, The Fith Brancl. Science Advisors as Policymakers
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), in particular c. 8 at 152.
161 See Elizabeth M. Rutherford, "The FDA and 'Privatization': The Drug Approval
Process" (1995) 50 Food & Drug L.J. 203; Elizabeth C. Price, "Teaching the Elephant to Dance:
Privatizing the FDA Review Process" (1996) 51 Food & Drug L.J. 651; and Henry I. Miller, "A
Proposal for FDA Reform" (2002) 1 Nature Rev. Drug Disc. 642. The key arguments advanced in
favour of privatization are improved efficiency and "more informed" reviewers. Though concerns
over privatization have historically been more pronounced in the United States, industry-led calls
for privatization of regulatory functions have found recognition in the report of the External
Advisory Committee on Smart Regulation, supra note 128 at 66. Among other things, the External
Advisory Committee recommends that regulatory capacity be built in "the private sector" and that
government tap federally funded research networks "to supplement their in-house scientific
knowledge." (Ibid. at 66-67). According to the committee, "By tapping into these existing resources,
Canada will be in a better position to inform its regulatory decision making with cutting edge
science and conduct scientific peer reviews when. needed." (Ibid. at 67).
162 See Marcia Angell, "Is Academic Medicine for Sale?" (2000) 342 New Eng J. Med.
1516; Richard A. Rettig, "The Industrialization of Clinical Research" (2000) 19 Health Aff. 129.
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 44, NO. 4
public interest in rigorous, independent risk assessment and evaluation
will be compromised. 63
2. Risk assessment and evaluation by REBS
The mandate of REBS is to ensure that the rights and welfare of
research subjects are protected. REBs ensure that clinical trials within
their institution are initiated and conducted in compliance with
predetermined substantive and procedural norms."6 The risk assessment
and evaluation conducted by REBS is increasingly recognized as an
essential component of the protection they provide,165 but they also
enforce a wide range of norms derived from principles of justice166 and
respect for persons. 67 Although the principal mandate of REBS is to
protect research subjects, many of the risk-related norms they enforce
have implications for the public interest in pre-market evaluation of new
drugs.
Like the TPD, REBs are called upon to assess and evaluate the
risks and benefits of clinical trials. Of course, the evidence upon which
REBS conduct their risk assessment is much more limited in nature than
that available to TPD reviewers,.given that it is conducted ex ante. While
163 See Glod6, supra note 105; Malcolm Dean, "Conflicts of Interest in Drug Regulation"
(1993) 342 Lancet 732; and Dennis Cauchon, "FDA Advisors Tied to Industry" USA Today (-25
September 2000), online: <www.usatoday.com>.
"6 That is, in accordance with the norms set forth in Medical Research Council of Canada,
Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada & Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council of Canada, TriCouncil Policy Statement. Ethical Conduct for Research
Involving Humans (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1998) [Tri Council
Policy Statemend. For clinical trials leading to an application for an NOC from the TPD, the clinical
trials regulations require compliance with the International Conference on Harmonization (ICH),
Good Clinical Practice Guidelines- International Conference on Harmonization of Technical
Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use - Good Clinical Practice.
Consolidated Guideline, (1 May 1996), online: <http://www.ifpma.org/ich5.html> [ICH,
Consolidated Guideline]. In the United States, the applicable regulations are issued by the
Department of Health and Human Services, 45 C.F.R pt. 46 (1991), and the FDA, 21 C.F.R. pt. 50
(1995) and 21 C.F.R. pt. 56 (1995).
" National Bioethics Advisory Commission, supra note 76 at 69-96; Charles Weijer, "The
Ethical Analysis of Risk" (2000) 28 J. Law Med. Ethics 344.
"These include ensuring that subject selection criteria are fair (that women, children, and
minorities are not excluded from study participation without reason), and that adequate, but not
excessive compensation, is provided to research subjects.
167 These include ensuring that consent documents and procedures are accurate and that
subjects' privacy and confidentiality are well protected.
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the results of Phase III clinical trials are not generally available for
scrutiny, the results of pre-clinical animal studies and any previous
clinical trials (e.g. Phase I and Phase II trials) will be submitted to the
REB by the principal investigator as supporting material in the study
justification. Important information will also be contained in the
protocol itself (e.g. dosage and procedures for patient monitoring). If
the REB reviewer has lingering questions about the evidence on which
the risk assessment is to be made, he or she may also conduct a
literature review to determine whether there have been any other
clinical trials completed or important interim results reported. Given the
well-noted workload problems from which REBS suffer, however, it is
unlikely that such literature reviews are routinely conducted.
While it can be argued that REBs appear to receive adequate
evidence upon which to make their risk assessments, it can also be said
that their capacity for conducting them rigorously is questionable. Like
the TPD, REBs' risk assessment requires scrutiny of highly complex
scientific information, and the calculation of the probability and
magnitude of potential harms and benefits. As Health Canada itself
recognized in the Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement accompanying
the new clinical trials regulations, many REBs have limited experience
reviewing clinical trials. Even REBS that do have this experience may not
have the necessary range of expertise in their membership to assess the
complex information contained in protocols submitted by investigators
from disparate specialities. Further, and in contrast to the TPD, REBs do
not have the financial resources to call in outside experts to conduct
assessments on their behalf.
While REBS are not as well situated as the TPD to assess risks,
they are comparatively better situated to evaluate them for at least three
reasons. First, REB evaluation of risk does not raise obvious problems of
legitimacy, because rules governing their composition require that their
membership include lay people and other non-scientists (including
lawyers, ethicists, and clerics). 6 Second, to fulfil their overall mandate,
168 Article 1.3 of the Tri-Council Policy Statement, supra note 164, sets out composition
requirements as follows: "The REB shall consist of at least five members, including both men and
women, of whom: (a) At least two members have broad expertise in the methods or in the areas of
research that are covered by the REB; (b) At least one member is knowledgeable in ethics; (c) For
biomedical research, at least one member is knowledgeable in the relevant law.., and; (d) At least
one member has no affiliation with the institution, but is recruited from the community served by
the institution." This is not to say that the situation is ideal. Many have complained that scientists
2006]
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REB members must routinely engage in debate over the ethical, legal,
and social issues raised by new technologies. Third, and perhaps most
importantly, REB risk evaluation is governed by standards which are
clearly stated and increasingly debated by the public.169
At least some of these points of difference between REBs and
the' TPD with respect to risk evaluation and assessment highlight
potentially fruitful avenues of coordination. The standards governing
REB evaluation of risk are a case in point. While many are clearly
designed to protect subjects, some have important, if yet largely
unrealized, implications for the type and quality of evidence generated
by clinical trials, and thus for the NOC review conducted by the TPD.
Canadian REBs are required to evaluate the risks and benefits of
a protocol according to an elaborate framework.'70 Any given clinical
trial protocol generally calls for a number of interventions involving the
subject. Generally, clinical trials employ a mixture of therapeutic
procedures, for which the evidence must support the promise of
therapeutic benefits to research subjects (e.g. the experimental drug)
and non-therapeutic procedures, which are administered solely to
address the research question (e.g. extra blood draws). The framework
holds that the presence of the potential for therapeutic benefit to
subjects (ie. therapeutic warrant) founds a morally significant
distinction between therapeutic and non-therapeutic procedures and, as
such, requires an evaluation of the risks associated with each according
to distinct standards. Clinical trials may proceed only when both sets of
standards are satisfied. Where implemented, these standards prefigure
dominate the debates within REB meetings, and others allege that some REBs fail to meet the
composition requirements. It is difficult to assess the merits of these claims. One consequence of
the lack of national oversight is lack of information on REB practices and compliance with
governing policies. See M.F. Marshall, "Taking the 'I' Out of IRB and Putting 'Community' In"
(2000) 16 Bioethics Forum 7; Harold Edgar & David Rothman, "The Institutional Review Board
and Beyond: Future Challenges to the Ethics of Human Experimentation" (1995) 73 Milbank Q.
489.
169 That is, the standards set forth in the Tri-Council Policy Statement in Canada and the
Common Rule (45 C.F.R. pt. 46 (1991)) in the United States. These standards are clearly stated
even if not always well elaborated or consistently implemented. For an argument in favour of
improved, uniform standards for institutional risk evaluation, see Charles Weijer & Paul B. Miller,
"When Are Research Risks Reasonable in Relation to Anticipated Benefits?" (2004) 10 Nature
Med. 570.
"z TriCouncil Policy Statement, supra note 164 at 1.5 and 7.1-7.6. See also Weijer, supra
note 165.
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the type of clinical trials conducted, and accordingly have a direct
impact on the development of new therapeutic products and the federal
drug approval process.
In evaluating the risks associated with non-therapeutic
procedures, REBS must be satisfied that three standards are met: the
risks associated with the non-therapeutic procedures must be
minimized; the risks must be reasonable in relation to the knowledge to
be gained from the study; and, with research involving vulnerable
subjects, the risks must fall below a threshold of permissible risk called
"minimal risk." '171.These standards allow socially beneficial interventions
to be carried out, and provide subjects special protection from exposure
to risk in the absence of therapeutic benefit. Yet the latter two standards
clearly have a wider impact by placing a limitation on the pursuit of the
interests of scientists, the industry, and the public at large in the
generation of scientific knowledge. In meeting the risk-knowledge
standard, for example, the REB weighs risks to subjects against the
interests of others in the generation of knowledge. Depending on the
importance of an intervention to the overall study design, the evaluation
may have a significant impact on the quality or significance of results
generated by the trial.
The standard for REB evaluation of the risks of therapeutic
interventions has even greater potential impact. REBS must determine
that therapeutic interventions meet the requirement of clinical
equipoise. That is, they must find that at the start of the study there
exists within the relevant community of clinical scientists a state of
"honest, professional disagreement as to the preferred treatment."' 172
The basic idea underlying clinical equipoise is that research subjects
ought not to be at risk of receiving inferior treatment solely to test a
promising, but unproven, experimental treatment. The upshot of the
requirement is that clinical trials can proceed only where the relevant
community of experts is in a state of significant disagreement as to the
relative therapeutic merits of. the therapeutic interventions to be
7 For discussion of the meaning of these standards and illustration of their enforcement,
see Paul B. Miller & Charles Weijer, "Evaluating Benefits and Harms in Research on Healthy
Children" in Eric Kodish, ed., Ethics and Research with Children (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2005) 29.
172 Benjamin Freedman, "Equipoise and the Ethics of Clinical Research" (1987) 317 New
Eng. J. Med. 141 at 144; Paul B. Miller.& Charles Weijer, "Rehabilitating Equipoise" (2003) 13
Kennedy Inst. Ethics J. 93.
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compared (ie. the experimental treatment and the control(s)). The
object of the clinical trial is to resolve this disagreement by providing
compelling evidence of the relative therapeutic merits of the
experimental treatment and the control(s).
The requirement for clinical equipoise has important
implications for the design of clinical trials, and thus the evidence they
produce. Where proven standard treatments for the subject's condition
exist, clinical equipoise requires that the experimental treatment be
compared against one or more of the standard treatments (as an active
control). Where no proven standard treatment exists, or where it is
consistent with the standard of care not to offer treatment (e.g. for
minor conditions like allergic rhinitis), a placebo-controlled trial may
proceed. It follows that, wherever possible, clinical trials must be
designed to give comparative rather than absolute evidence of safety
and efficacy. The implications for the drug approval process are
important: if REBS consistently enforced the clinical equipoise
requirement, the clinical trials submitted to federal authorities (and
ultimately relied upon by physicians pract ising EBM) would provide
optimally useful data with which to determine the safety and efficacy of
treatments.
B. Identifying the potential for coordination
1. Standard setting
The caveat is that, if applied consistently, the requirement for
clinical equipoise would have important implications for federal drug
approval and physicians practising EBM. While it is not exactly clear
what Canadian REBs are doing, it is evident that they are not
consistently applying the clinical equipoise requirement. This can be
adduced from the fact that clinical trials in Canada involving
pharmaceuticals commonly continue to be placebo-controlled. 73
173 Charles Weijer, "Placebo Trials and Tribulations" (2002) 166 Can. Med. Assoc. J. 603.
While I have found no evidence on the proportion of placebo-controlled trials conducted in
Canada, the fact that such trials are common can be safely deduced in consideration of the
resources devoted to the National Placebo Initiative, a joint effort of Health Canada and the
Canadian Institutes of Health Research, online: <http://www.cihr-irsc.gc.ca/e/5466.html>. For
indirect evidence, see Joel Lexchin, "New Drugs with Novel Therapeutic Characteristics: Have
They Been Subject to Randomized Controlled Trials?" (2002) 48 Can. Fam. Physician 1487.
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The reason for the divergence between policy and practice lies in
the lack of coordination between institutional and federal oversight and
approval policies and practices. While it is unclear what standards the
TPD employs in evaluating the risks and benefits of new therapeutic
products, the standard is evidently not clinical equipoise, for the TPD
continues to issue NOCs on the basis of placebo-controlled clinical trials
of drugs even when proven standard treatments exist. Canadian REBS
likely approve these trials because of unclear and possibly inconsistent
guidance.
While the trial design implications of the clinical equipoise
condition contained in the Tri- Council Policy Statement are pretty clear,
matters were muddied somewhat when, in enacting the new clinical
trials regulations, the federal government endorsed the ICH guideline174
rather than the Tri- Council Policy Statement. The Tri- Council Policy
Statement and the ICH guideline do not contain inconsistent standards
for risk evaluation. The problem is that the ICH guideline does not
establish any clear standards for risk evaluation (though it says such
evaluation must take place), and, further, has a permissive clause on the
use of placebo controls.'75
The clear conflict between the Tri- Council Policy Statement and
REB practice, and the possible conflict between the former and the ICH
guideline, underscores the need for a coordinated effort at setting
standards. In view of the considerable implications of the risk evaluation
standards, this effort should be open and transparent, and should
consider the implications for reseatch subjects and the public at large.
Currently, the debate over risk evaluation standards is largely
focused on the issue of appropriate placebo use. The field of debate is
occupied, on the one hand, by those who assert that the widespread use
of placebo controls is inconsistent with the ethical and legal duties of
researchers to subjects," 6 and, on the other, by those who argue that the
practice is justified on the grounds that placebo-controlled trials are
17
4 ICH, Consolidated Guideline, supra note 164.
'
7 5 ICH Harmonised Tripartite Guideline Choice of a Control Group and Related Issues
in Clinical Trials (I CH E10).
76 See Benjamin Freedman, Kathleen C. Glass & Charles Weijer, "Placebo Orthodoxy in
Clinical Research I: Empirical and Methodological Myths" (1996) 24 J. Law Med. Ethics 243;
Benjamin Freedman, Kathleen C. Glass & Charles Weijer, "Placebo Orthodoxy in Clinical
Research II: Ethical, Legal and Regulatory Myths" (1996) 24 J. Law Med. Ethics 252.
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methodologically superior to, and cheaper than, active-controlled
trials.177 A national working group on the use of placebo controls (the
National Placebo Initiative, struck jointly by Health Canada and the
Canadian Institutes of Health Research) has recently produced a final
report which contains an illuminating and very persuasive case for a
restrictive stance on the use of placebo controls in Canadian research.178
Despite the fact that debate over risk evaluation standards ultimately
underlies the placebo debate, the working group was not given the
mandate to issue recommendations on such standards (e.g. clinical
equipoise).
The recommendations of the National Placebo Initiative provide
a compelling starting point. However, a coordinated effort to address
the. standards issue could usefully broaden the debate by encouraging
the adoption of a systemic perspective. Such a perspective would
consider the implications of the standards governing REB review for
drug approval and EBM. Ensuring that TPD standards of evidence for
the efficacy of therapeutic products are in conformity with the
requir ement of clinical equipoise would be consistent with the
Romanow commission's proposed mandate for a national drug agency
(which would replace the TPD and related bureaux within Health
Canada). Among other things, the commission recommended that the
drug approval process involve "[comparison of] the efficiency of new
prescription drugs to existing drugs on the market or to other
therapeutic approaches that could be used."'79 As the Romanow
commission noted, "this is critically important information for
policymakers and health care providers to guide their decisions on
including prescription drugs in insurance plans or in choosing the most
effective medication or treatment."' 8 ° The Romanow commission was
concerned to move drug approval in this direction in light of mounting
evidence of the considerable cost, 8 ' and the questionable therapeutic
'Z Franklin G. Miller & Howard Brody, "What Makes Placebo-Controlled Trials
Unethical?" (2002) 2 Am. J. Bioethics 3; Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Franklin G. Miller, "The Ethics of
Placebo-Controlled Trials: A Middle Ground" (2001) 345 New Eng. J. Med. 915.
1 National Placebo Initiative, Final Report of the National Placebo Working Committee
on the Appropriate Use of Placebos in Clinical Trials in Canada (Ottawa: Health Canada and the
Canadian Institutes of Health Research, 2004).
" Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada, supra note 149 at 200.
180 Ibid.
1 Canadian Institute for Health Information, supra note 26.
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progress, 112 associated with many new drugs. If the authorities
responsible for drug approval are to assess new drugs on a cost-benefit
basis, and to disseminate useful information on the comparative safety
and efficacy of treatments, they will have to work with REBs and other
stakeholders to determine the feasibility of system-wide adoption and
enforcement of the clinical equipoise requirement.
2. Information sharing
The accuracy of risk assessment and evaluation depends in large
part on the quality and extent of information before the reviewer. Both
REB and TPD risk assessment and evaluation can benefit from mutual
sharing .of information.
The prospects for information sharing are many. Considering
the excessive workloads under which they operate, REBS would benefit
greatly if the TPD granted them access to its information on the risk-
benefit profiles of pharmaceuticals.'83 The TPD could also play an
essential role in the REBS' effort to ensure that research subjects are safe
by relaying alerts, adverse event reports, and notices of termination of
studies in other countries. Realizing these benefits would require a
reversal of TPD policy, which currently goes to great'lengths to maintain
the secrecy of commercially sensitive information.". Such. a policy
reversal would lend substance to the rhetoric of transparency and
accountability which now dominates the regulatory reform movement in
Canada,185 and would be a natural consequence of the international
movement toward clinical trials registries.'86
The TPD may likewise benefit from information sharing
arrangements with REBS. Notice of REB refusal to approve clinical trials
182 U.S., National Institute for Health Care Management, Changing Patterns of
Pharmaceutical Innovation (Washington: National Institute for Health Care Management, 2002) at
3-4, online: <http://www.nihcm.org/innovations.pdf>; Patented Medicine Prices Review Board,
Annual Report- 2004 (Ottawa: Patented Medicine Prices Review Board, 2004), fig. 2 at 11, online:
<http://www.pmprb-cepmb.gc.ca/CMFiles/pmprb-ar04-el5MYB-682005-9338.pdf>.
183 While no such information would be available for new molecular entities, the greatest
proportion of new pharmaceuticals coming to market are "me too" drugs. Sometimes, these have
pharmacological profiles similar to their competitors' drugs.
"See Lexchin, "Secrecy," supra note 121.
" Sibbald, supra note 102; External Advisory Committee on Smart Regulation, supra note
128.
"86 Infra note 191.
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may prove particularly helpful, considering that nothing currently
prevents sponsors of clinical trials from "shopping" their ethically and/or
scientifically deficient protocols to different REBs across the country.'87
Notices of refusal, particularly when many in number, may alert federal
reviewers that something may be amiss with clinical trial evidence
eventually submitted in support of an application for an NOC.
Though commonly thought unachievable in light of the contrary
interests of the pharmaceuticals industry, the informational holy grail
would be the establishment of a comprehensive and mandatory national
electronic clinical trials registry, accessible to REBs, the TPD, physicians,
and ideally, the general public.'88 The registry would be an electronically
searchable. database containing comprehensive information on all
completed and ongoing clinical trials. Because trials conducted outside
Canada can be used to support drug approval, it would be essential that
such a registry be linked to others internationally. A mandatory national
registry linked with registries around the world would make it much
easier for all to obtain some of the most important evidence on which
they must base their decisions. It would further enable communication
about evidence between REBs and the TPD. Because the potential
benefits of a mandatory national clinical trials registry are significant, it
merits intensive feasibility studies.
At present, the prospects for the establishment of a clinical trials
registry may be improving, at least if recent developments in the United
States are any indication. Former New York State Attorney General
Elliott Spitzer recently filed suit against GlaxoSmithKline, charging
"repeated persistent fraud" for its failure to disclose unfavourable
results of clinical trials in which Paxil® was being tested for the
treatment of depressed adolescents.'89 In the aftermath of public
controversy following the suit, 9 ' the American Medical Association
'
8 7Lemmens & Freedman, supra note 86.
"88 Health Canada has recently held workshops on registration. See online: <http://www.hc-
sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/prodpharma/activit/proj/enreg-clini-info/ctrw-ecra-e.html>. There is an existing
government registry. in the United States: <http://www.clinicaltrials.gov>. For a review, see
Deborah A. Zarin, Tony Tse & Nicholas C. Ide, "Trial Registration and ClinicalTrials.gov between
May and October 2005" (2005) 353 New Eng. J. Med. 2779.
t.. Office of the New York State Attorney General, "Major Pharmaceutical Firm
Concealed Drug Information," Press Release (2 June 2004), online:
<http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2004/jun/un2b_04.html>.
. ""When Drug Companies Hide Data," Editorial, The New York Times(6 June 2004) 12.
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(AMA) and the Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMc)
issued calls for the Department of Health and Human Services to
establish a national clinical trials database. AAMC President Dr. Jordan
Cohen said "the association believes a mandatory public clinical trials
registry would be a significant step toward strengthening the reliability
and credibility of clinical research, which is so vital to advancing
medicine and improving health.' '91 If mounting momentum towards the
establishment of registries192 proves successful; it may be hoped that
Health Canada will follow suit by instituting a mandatory Canadian
database, and exploring possibilities for sharing results collected in
other national and international'93 databases. REB and TPD review
would be vastly improved under this scenario.
3. Resource sharing or pooling
Resource sharing or pooling is yet another potential point of
mutually beneficial coordination between REBs and the TPD.
Risk assessment suffers when REBS lack the requisite expertise.
Accurate risk assessment requires the analysis of complex scientific
information and the calculation of the probability and magnitude of
harms and benefits. Where REBs do not have the capability to conduct
risk assessments properly, their ultimate risk evaluation will be skewed,
regardless of the conceptual coherence of their standards. One possible
remedy would be for the TPD and REBS to establish a resource pooling
arrangement, whereby scientists (including those at the TPD) who are
"9' Suria Santana, "Call for Clinical Trials Registry Gaining Momentum" AAMCReporter
(August 2004), online: Association of American Medical Colleges <http://www.aamc.org/
newsroom/reporter/aug04/clinicaltrials.htm >.
192 Catherine D. DeAngelis et al., "Clinical Trial Registration: A Statement from the
International Committee of Medical Journal Editors" (2004) J.A.M.A. 1363; David Moher & Alan
Berstein, "Registering CIHR-Funded Randomized Controlled Trials: A Global Public Good" (2004)
171 Can. Med. Assoc. J. 750; Trudo Lemmens, "Piercing the Veil of Corporate Secrecy About
Clinical Trials" (2004) 34 Hastings Center Rep. 14; Catherine D. DeAngelis etal, "Is This Clinical
Trial Fully Registered? A Statement from the International Committee of Medical Journal
Editors" (2005) 293 J.A.M.A. 2927. Industry's effort to control the agenda through establishing a
registry of its own is telling of the degree of momentum. See the International Federation of
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers & Associations (IFPMA) Clinical Trials Portal, online:
< http://www.ifpma.org/clinicaltrials.html >.
193 The World Health Organization has announced its intentioA to establish a voluntary
global clinical trials registry. See Victoria S. Elliot, "WHO Plans Global Clinical Trials Registry"
American Medical News (AMNews.com) (26 July 2004), online: <http//www.ama-
assn.org/amednews/2004/07/26/hlsd0726.htm >.
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willing to be called in for ad hoc reviews could be identified in a
coordinated way. TPD participation would be essential, given its
experience in calling upon outside experts for their own reviews. Of
course, as indicated above, independence is an important concern with
respect to reviews conducted by external scientists. Measures to ensure
the independence of the reviews would be required, and the
consultation ought only to include risk assessment, not evaluation. An
alternative arrangement would have the TPD enter into a resource
sharing arrangement with REBs, whereby it would volunteer its own
scientists for REB review in exchange for access to scientists from REBs
whose expertise it could use. As an effective means to integrate the
institutional cultures of REBs and the TPD, this alternative may be most
attractive.
A resource-sharing arrangement between the TPD and REBS may
also partially resolve problems of democratic legitimacy created when
risk evaluation is dominated by scientists. Such an arrangement might
allow the TPD to call on lay and other non-scientist members of REBs to
consult on policy development affecting risk evaluation, or participate in
the evaluation of potentially controversial new treatments. REB
members will generally have relevant expertise and valuable experience
in bringing public concerns and perceptions to bear on the evaluation of
the risks and benefits of new technologies and treatments.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS: DIRECTIONS FOR REFORM
OF RESEARCH GOVERNANCE
Recognition of the relationship between REB and TPD review
and of the importance of coordination in policy making and
implementation helps identify priorities for systemic reform of the
governance of clinical trials in Canada. The case for systemic reform is
complicated, as is the task of comprehensively identifying reform
priorities. Nonetheless, without making any pretence to
comprehensiveness,'94 the following steps and reforms are essential to
the realization of a system of national governance operating in accord
with the ideal of coordinated review.
""4 For more comprehensive recommendations, see Jocelyn Downie & Fiona McDonald,
"Revisioning the Oversight of Research Involving Humans in Canada" (2004) 12 Health L.J. 159.
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First, a major summit aimed at clearly identifying problems with
the status quo and priorities for reform of the governance of human
subjects research should be held in Canada. The summit should be
jointly convened by representatives of federal and provincial/territorial
governments, and should include representatives of stakeholders
including health professionals, public research institutions, the
pharmaceuticals industry, patients, REB members and administrators,
lawyers, bioethicists, and members of the lay public.
Second, it is critical for the federal and provincial/territorial
governments to reach an agreement on* (1) the need for a national
governance strategy and structure; (2) the costs and benefits of
developing this structure, available resources, and cost sharing; and (3)
the basic principles for reform.
Third, legislation should be drafted to establish an office within
Health Canada with departments responsible for (1) theestablishment
and maintenance of a mandatory national clinical trials database; (2) the
accreditation and oversight of federal and institutional review bodies;
and (3) the coordination of resource sharing between federal and
institutional bodies.
Fourth, there is also a need for the establishment, preferably
through legislation, of (1) consistent, mutually supportive, national
procedural and substantive standards for federal and institutional review
of research; (2) meaningful penalties for non-compliance with the
above-mentioned standards by institutions, researchers, and research
sponsors; and (3) enforcement and compliance mechanisms.
Clinical trials have privileged evidentiary status within the drug
approval process and within clinical medicine. The ongoing discovery
and improvement of medical treatments through clinical science
depends heavily on the maintenance of public trust and confidence in
the scientific and ethical integrity of research. Institutional and federal
oversight bodies play essential roles in ensuring that the conduct of
clinical science merits the public's trust. For REBs and the TPD to fulfill
their respective roles in safeguarding the rights and welfare of patients
and the Canadian public at large, the government must recognize and
respond to the need for a national governance structure in which the
federal and institutional review of clinical research is coordinated and
harmonized.
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